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ROGER WILLIAMS' GIFT
[Wihen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of Separa-
tion between the Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of
the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed
the Candlestick, and made his Garden a Wilderness, as at this
day.1
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court founded a jurisprudence of separatism on
this metaphor.2 Yet, the origin of the metaphor is Roger Williams,
not Thomas Jefferson. Roger Williams wrote these words some
150 years before Jefferson used the phrase.3 The history of the
metaphor symbolizes our regard of Roger Williams. Most of us
have heard of Roger Williams; many of us recognize him as a reli-
gious prophet; but few know of his contributions to religious free-
dom and the American heritage. We know him more as a symbol of
religious freedom than for his actual thoughts on the topic. This
Article examines Williams' religious thought in order to illuminate
his influence on religious freedom in America.
Roger Williams was an original thinker on issues of church
and state. His central thesis was the inviolability of conscience in
matters of faith. This thought constitutes a core of religious free-
dom, a bridge in American thought from Roger Williams, to the
framing of the First Amendment religious protections, to Supreme
Court jurisprudence today. Conscience was the medium by which
man communicated with God. No authority, therefore, was justi-
fied in entering this sacred haven. Each man, moreover, was as
worthy as another; all stood equal before God in their assertion of
conscience. From these premises, Roger Williams advocated toler-
ance for all believers in society, even if he felt particular persons to
be gravely mistaken in their beliefs. These thoughts helped lay the
1. Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Examined and Answered (1644)
[hereinafter Cotton's Letter Examined] (emphasis added), reprinted in 1 The Com-
plete Writings of Roger Williams 313, 392 (Russel & Russel, Inc. 1963) [hereinafter
Complete Writings].
2. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947) (citing Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) (quoting Thomas Jefferson)).
3. Compare Cotton's Letter Examined, supra note 1, at 392 (advocating the
separation of church and state), with Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah
Dodge and Others, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in Connecti-
cut (Jan. 1, 1802) [hereinafter Danbury Church Letter], reprinted in Thomas Jef-
ferson: Writings 510 (1984) (same).
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foundation for the peaceful coexistence of religion and society, and
also, for the pluralistic democracy we inhabit today.
The purposes of this Article are, first, to assess Roger Wil-
liams' contribution to the building of religious freedom in America
and, second, assess how his thinking stands up today, as compared
against the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. To acquire some
understanding of Roger Williams, the man and his times, Part I
examines briefly his life. Roger Williams was an interesting figure
in American history. He was our first rebel and our first anthro-
pologist, studying and writing about the ways and languages of
Native Americans, translating the culture of the New World for the
Old World. He founded the Baptist Church in America. He was
also a talented statesmen, twice securing an English charter for
the new colony of Providence, later to become Rhode Island, which
he organized, administered, and served as president.
Part II turns to an evaluation of Williams' work on religious
freedom. Inspired by faith, Williams was a very original thinker
on matters of church and state. To defend conscience, he recon-
ceived the relationship of church to state, desiring to separate
church from state and attempting to define the boundaries of each.
He argued against establishment of national churches, reasoning
from his experiences with orthodoxy in England and New England.
Out of respect for conscience, he extended respect and protection
on equal terms to all faiths, developing ideals of tolerance, which
helped meet the needs of a growing, and increasingly diverse, soci-
ety. These ideas formed a significant strand of thought that led to
influence in the framing of the First Amendment, which Part III
examines.
Part IV evaluates Roger Williams' thought in light of Supreme
Court jurisprudence in order to assess how his philosophy reso-
nates today. Assessing modern law against original thinking, from
time to time, is useful because it allows us to see who we once were
so that we might better understand who we have become. This is
particularly the case with modern Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clause law, which seems as perplexing today as when the
Court first entered the area.4
4. In the modem era, the Supreme Court began interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause in Cantwell u. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and the Estab-
lishment Clause in Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
1999] ROGER WILLIAMS' GIFT 429
I. THE LIFE OF ROGER WILLIAMS
Roger Williams was a controversial figure in early American
society. His cry for conscience was forged on the anvils of his own
experiences, which were often bitter and difficult ones. For cause
of conscience, in 1635, Williams was formally banished from the
Massachusetts Bay Colony and left to exile, in the dead of winter,
in Providence, which he founded on democratic principles and reli-
gious freedom. To understand Williams' thinking, some insight
into the man and his time is necessary. We know him mainly to-
day as a religious prophet. In his day, however, he was also known
as an anthropologist, rebel, and statesman.
Roger Williams was born in 1603, in all probability, in London.
He was learned in theology and law. While in London, he at-
tracted the attention of Lord Coke, as a reporter of speeches and
sermons in the Star Chamber.5 Impressed with the young Wil-
liams, Coke became his benefactor, sending him to preparatory
school and then to Cambridge.6 Cambridge was a center of Puri-
tan thought,7 attracting the likes of John Milton. While at
Cambridge, he aligned himself against the established Church of
5. See Reuben Aldridge Guild, Introduction to The Writings of Roger Wil-
liams, in 1 Complete Writings, supra note 1, at 3, 6. Sir Edward Coke's daughter
observed: "'This Roger Williams, when he was a youth, would, in a short-hand,
take sermons and speeches in the Star Chamber, and present them to my dear
father. He, seeing so hopeful a youth, took such liking to him that he sent him to
Sutton's Hospital.'" Id.
Professor Guild notes that Williams was born in Wales, but then went to
London. See id. The later historical work of Professor Gaustad places Williams'
birth in London. Of course, as Professor Gaustad notes, "filling in that bare outline
[of Williams' history] is more a matter of conjecture than of historical record. Wil-
liams himself left behind no detailed account of his youthful days, and his boyhood
contemporaries did little to shore up the many gaps." Edwin S. Gaustad, Liberty
of Conscience: Roger Williams in America 5 (1991).
6. See Guild, supra note 5, at 7. Roger Williams went to Sutton's Hospital
(later called Charter House) for preparatory school. See id. at 6. At Charter
House, Williams learned Greek and Latin, which he became proficient in. While
there is some dispute over the evidence, it seems Williams went to Cambridge, and
not Oxford. See id. at 7. Professor Gaustad notes, for example, that Williams went
to Pembroke College of Cambridge. See Gaustad, supra note 5, at 5. Pembroke
College, of course, later became the model for the women's college, of that name, of
Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island.
7. The fundamental notion of Puritanism was that man was depraved and
could not be saved, but from the grace of God. See Edmund S. Morgan, Roger
Williams: The Church and the State 11 (1967).
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England.8 After graduating from Cambridge, Williams became a
Separatist, the name given for those who left the Church of Eng-
land to search for a "purer" church.9
By this time, under Charles I, the religious strife that would
plague England most of the century had started.'0 This strife,
which included purges of religious and political dissenters, per-
suaded Roger Williams to leave England, as many Puritans had
begun to do. In 1630, Roger Williams, with his wife, left England
from Bristol, landing in Boston ten weeks later on February 5,
1631. For Williams, as many dissenters, the New World offered a
haven for their beliefs and a new start.1
Even before Williams left England, it would seem likely that
many of his core beliefs had formed. Religious intolerance, as he
experienced, was a terrible crime. Its remedy was freedom of con-
science, which became Williams' cause. Government should pun-
ish crime, but never religious conscience or opinion. Williams'
reputation as a learned and inspirational minister preceded him.
The church in Boston extended a generous invitation to Williams
to become their minister. But Williams rejected the offer because
he found the church insufficiently separated from the Church of
England and, therefore, to his thinking, impure. He did not want
to officiate in a church with ties to the English Church.' 2 This
8. See Guild, supra note 5, at 8.
9. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 17. These churches existed by covenant of
the people with God. "God offered the covenant of grace to all who attained faith."
Id. at 14. The covenanted people then strictly followed gospel, offering sacrament
only to the religiously faithful. See id. at 16; see also Guild, supra note 5, at 8
(noting Williams' opposition to the established church).
10. The religious strife started under James I, and continued with Charles I.
Charles I decided on a course of strong, monarchial rule, which included his con-
tempt for popular sovereignty. His aim included the church, which he wanted to
purge of all Calvinists, including the Puritans, and restore it along more Roman
Catholic ways. See Guild, supra note 5, at 9. The battle was thus drawn between a
Catholic oriented King and a Protestant Parliament. See Thomas J. Curry, The
First Freedoms, Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amend-
ment 2 (1986).
11. The settlers carried their English pride to the New World. Many left Hol-
land, which had treated them well, because they wanted to raise their children
English, and not Dutch. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 81. There is also evidence
that some settlers did not feel comfortable in the liberal climate of Holland, prefer-
ring a more ordered society. See Museum Commemorates Pilgrims' Years in Exile
in Holland, Prov. J. Bull., Nov. 27, 1997, at A17.
12. Perhaps on account of his own experiences, Williams would remain hyper-
sensitive to contacts with the Church of England throughout his life. Williams:
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event confirmed his separatism. To his contemporaries, Williams
was considered a rigid separatist and purist, unwilling to compro-
mise in matters of faith.
From Boston, Williams went to Salem where he became an as-
sistant to the minister of the oldest church in Massachusetts,
which was independent of the Church of England. 13 But almost
immediately, the magistrates of Massachusetts Bay Colony inter-
fered with his ministry.14 Their efforts were successful as Wil-
liams withdrew from Salem to quell the controversy. He went to
Plymouth, beyond the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Bay,
where he was welcomed. 15 He stayed in Plymouth for two years,
preaching and speaking his mind. By and large, these were happy
years. He became well-acquainted with Native Americans, trans-
acting business with them, learning their language, and gaining
their favor.16 His interaction with natives would remain a life-long
interest that would gain him fame and respect.
He returned to Salem in 1633 to resume his ministry; some
residents of Plymouth followed him. 17 He was a popular minister.
However, during his stay in Salem the controversy which led to his
believed that the Church of England was not a true church because of its
alignment with the Church of Rome under the rule of Mary Tudor and
because it was a "national church" instead of a visible congregation con-
sisting only of true Christians. He maintained that a true church could
only be one that separated from the false Church of England and re-
nounced any past and future association with that church.
Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U.
L. Rev. 455, 466 (1991).
13. See Guild, supra note 5, at 12.
14. Among other interferences, Massachusetts sent a letter to the church
questioning their decision to hire Williams, since Williams had refused the offer of
the Boston church and had, among other things, questioned the authority of gov-
ernment to punish religious offenses. See id. at 12-13. At the time of the colony's
beginning, the General Court, including its magistrates, performed most of the
functions of government, including legislative, executive, and judicial.
15. See id. at 16-17. The Puritans of Plymouth were more tolerant of religion,
and also more alienated from the Church of England, than those of Massachusetts
Bay. Thus, it was a better fit for Williams. In fact, in 1632, Massachusetts Bay
passed a law that no one could enter the body politic unless they were a member of
the church. While the colony later revoked the law, it evidenced the increasing
theocratic nature of the colony. See id. at 16.
16. As Roger Williams put it, "'God was pleased to give me a painful, patient
spirit, to lodge with them in their filthy, smoky holes, even while I lived at Plym-
outh and Salem, to gain their tongue.'" Id. at 18.
17. There is some evidence of complaints about Williams in Plymouth, on sus-
pected Anabaptist and rigid Separatist grounds. See id. at 17.
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banishment ripened. By now, some of Williams' ideas were un-
doubtedly fixed. No human power had the right to interfere with
conscience. Conscience was a matter strictly between a person and
God. A church or a state may not prescribe religious faith. Expres-
sion of these views led him to confrontation with officials.' 5 The
Salem church tried to protect Williams, but the controversy
intensified.
In April 1635, the General Court, in Boston, summoned Wil-
liams to appear in order to answer charges that he refused to give
an oath of loyalty to the colony, which Williams considered to be
contrary to the rights of Englishmen; that he taught that the state
should not enforce an oath on an unregenerate person since this
would involve taking God's name in vain; and that, among other
points, Williams contested the claim of the King to the land of the
New World since Williams believed the Indians owned the land. 19
Williams also denounced a colony law that required people to at-
tend worship and support the church. "'No one,' . . . 'should be
bound to maintain a worship against his own consent.'" 20 These
events led to Williams' banishment for such "new and dangerous
opinions."2 ' To the rulers of Massachusetts Bay, Williams was a
18. See id. at 19. In all other ways, especially over religious doctrine, Wil-
liams was a pretty orthodox Calvinist.
19. See id. at 20-23. Most of these positions were, of course, rooted in Wil-
liams' religious beliefs. Williams' opposition to oaths was grounded in his belief
that they were an act of worship. Moreover, their indiscriminate administration in
England convinced him of their arbitrariness. See generally Perry Miller, Rogers
Williams: His Contribution to the American Tradition 19 (1965) (stating that, after
Williams became a puritan, he rejected Anglican ceremonial and church
government).
However, from the Puritan viewpoint, oaths were essential to the social fabric.
Courts relied on oaths to obtain truthful testimony. The government used oaths to
test for and, if necessary, purge insurgents. See Hall, supra note 12, at 466.
Equally threatening to the Puritans was Williams' challenge to their land
claim, based on a grant from the King of England. Puritans feared that their oppo-
nents might succeed in having their royal patent annulled. See id. at 465. Thus,
Williams was, in actuality, quite subversive of the Puritan social order.
20. Guild, supra note 5, at 23 (quoting Roger Williams).
21. Id. at 27 (quoting the Act banishing Roger Williams). The General Court
listed four offenses of opinion that formed the basis of Williams' banishment.
These were, first, that magistrates should not punish breaches of the first four
commandants (known as the First Table), which dealt with religious matters, like
keeping the Sabbath holy and not blaspheming God, unless the breaches disturb
civil peace. This reflected Williams' belief that government had no authority over
religion, a theory he kept his whole life. The second offense was that magistrates
ought not to tender oaths to the unregenerate (people who had not received salva-
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nuisance and subversive.22 To Williams, Puritan society was in-
sufficiently pure.
To his Puritan contemporaries, Williams seemed an eccentric,
if not dangerous, man.23 His opinions and actions rattled the Puri-
tan social order. Having left England for religious principle, he
now found himself in the same position, involuntarily, with respect
to Massachusetts. Roger Williams had become the country's first
rebel. As a rebel, Williams was a pretty admirable figure. He ac-
ted out of principle; his actions were consistent with his words, de-
spite the cost, which was considerable. So the long American spirit
of rebellion started on a firm basis.
Ordered out of Massachusetts in the dead of winter, Roger
Williams made his way southward to escape the authorities, first
to Seekonk, Massachusetts, and then to the area beyond Massa-
chusetts, outside of its jurisdiction, which he called "Providence,"
in appreciation of his deliverance, where he landed by boat, in
June 1636.24 Williams acquired land from Native Americans, with
whom he was friendly and who trusted him, in consideration of his
"many kindnesses and services" to them and their friends. 25 This
was a sign of the high respect the Indians held for Williams. In
late 1638, he was publicly immersed in a "rebaptism." He founded
tion), as mentioned. Third was that a person ought not to pray with the impure
and, fourth, that a person should not give thanks after sacrament or a meal. See
id. at 23. These ideas were rooted in Puritanism and Separatism. Yet, even for
these theologies, these beliefs were, for the day, quite radical, challenging Puritan
ideas to the core. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 27.
22. See Miller, supra note 19, at 27.
23. The name of Roger Williams has been handed down to us by Puritan writ-
ers loaded with reproach. "He is described... as a rigid Brownist, precise and
uncharitable; and of the most turbulent and boisterous passions." Guild, supra
note 5, at 47. To his contemporaries, "Williams was a recognizable-and tedious-
type: one who took the Bible with a foolish literalness." Miller, supra note 19, at
26. "He was the worst kind of virtuous man, a perfectionist who made dogmas out
of purity and demanded that the rest of the world conform to him rather than he to
them." Id. at 26-27.
24. In all of this, Williams outran the authorities, who had sent a ship to Sa-
lem to transport him to Boston, where he would be exiled to England. See Guild,
supra note 5, at 32-33. His friend, John Winthrop, directed him away from Massa-
chusetts and toward Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island. See id. at 33-34.
25. Id. at 34 (footnote omitted). "'I spared'... 'no cost towards them, and in
gifts to... [them] ... tokens and presents many years before I came in person to
the Narragansett; and when I came, I was welcome.., to the old prince.., who
was most shy of all English, to his last breath.'" "'It was not'. . . 'thousands, nor
tens of thousands of money could have bought of him... an English entrance to
this Bay.'" Id. (quoting Roger Williams).
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the first Baptist church in North America, in Providence, although
he did not stay a Baptist long.2 6
With the influx of emigrants into the colony of Providence, it
became necessary to establish a government. In 1638, Williams
helped draw up a model for government, based on democratic prin-
ciples for the small township. The paper constituted an agreement
between the original settlers and "newcomers," subjecting them to
obedience "'only in civil things.'" 27 By 1640, settlement had pro-
ceeded to such a point that town business could no longer be de-
cided by general town meeting. Articles of government were
drawn up. Prominent among the principles was "'[wle agree, [als
formerly hath been the liberties of the town, so still, to hold forth
liberty of conscience.'" 28 As later confirmed by colonial legislation,
in Newport, liberty of conscience was made the basis of the law for
the first time in the western world.29
Yet, Rhode Island's troubles were not over. Authorities from
the neighboring New England colonies of Massachusetts Bay,
Plymouth, and Connecticut formed a military alliance, called the
United Colonies. This alliance pointedly excluded the Narragan-
sett Bay towns of Providence, Portsmouth, Newport, and Warwick.
Viewing this as a threat to their land, the residents of the Narra-
gansett colony asked Williams to go to London to secure a charter
for their colony, which he did, traveling by way of New York to
avoid Massachusetts. By this time, in 1642, Charles I had fled
London and Civil War had begun. So Williams went to Parliament
to secure the patent, which was ruling in the King's stead.30
With time on his hands, Williams wrote, by "a rude lamp at
Sea," A Key into the Language of America,31 which was published
26. The church was among the earliest Baptist churches in the world, the first
having been established in London in 1611.
27. Guild, supra note 5, at 38 (footnote omitted); accord Gaustad, supra note
5, at 48-49.
28. Guild, supra note 5, at 38-39 (source unknown).
29. As Justice Story noted, "'we read for the first time ... the declaration, that
"conscience should be free, and men should not be punished for worshiping God in
the way they were persuaded he required,7-a declaration, which, to the honor of
Rhode Island, she has never departed from.'" Id. at 39 (footnote omitted).
30. 1 am indebted to Professor J. Stanley Lemons, of Rhode Island College, for
insight into this early history of Rhode Island.
31. Roger Williams, A Key into the Language of America (J. Hammond Trum-
bull ed., 1866) (1643) thereinafter Key], reprinted in 1 Complete Writings, supra
note 1, at 77, 79.
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when he arrived in London in 1643. This book made him famous
overnight. It was the first work written, in English, on the lan-
guage and customs of Native Americans. He had translated, in ef-
fect, the ways of the New World for the Old, hoping to "unlock some
Rarities concerning the Natives themselves, not yet discovered."32
Significantly, Key gave Williams credibility, which he would later
need in his religious battles.
Williams arrived in London in the middle of the Civil War.
The affairs of the colonies were run by a Parliamentary commis-
sion, which included, as members, Henry Vane, a leader in the
House of Commons and an advocate, like Williams, of religious
freedom, Oliver Cromwell and John Pym. Vane became a close
friend of Williams, and was instrumental in his cordial reception
by the commission, which granted him, in the name of the King, a
charter for Rhode Island, dated March 14, 1644, giving "'Provi-
dence Plantations in the Narragansett Bay' full power to rule
themselves" as they preferred. 33
Williams stayed on in London to publish his masterpiece, The
Bloody Tenent, of Persecution, for Cause of Conscience,3 4 his fa-
mous cry for cause of conscience written in response to his ar-
chrival, John Cotton, a prominent churchman of Massachusetts
Bay. The book was hastily written and published, known perhaps
more for the title than a reading of its contents.35 While published
32. Id. at 79. Williams hoped Key would improve communication among
Europeans and Indians. In the language of the Narragansett, the book meant
"lost" in a physical sense, but also carried the additional meaning of lost in a spiri-
tual sense.
33. Guild, supra note 5, at 40-41 (quoting the Charter of 1644). The charter
declared:
[N]o person within the said colony, at any time hereafter, shall be any
wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differ-
ences in opinion in matters of religion, and do not actually disturb the
civil peace of our said colony; but that all and every person and persons
may... freely and fully have and enjoy his and their own judgments and
consciences, in matters of religious concernments ... they behaving them-
selves peaceably and quietly, and not using this liberty to licentiousness
and profaneness, nor to the civil injury or outward disturbance of others.
Sources of Our Liberties: Documentary Origins of Individual Liberties in
the United States Constitution in the United States and Bill of Rights 170
(Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper rev. ed. 1959).
34. Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent, of Persecution, for Cause of Con-
science (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., 1867) (1644) [hereinafter Bloody Tenent], re-
printed in 3 Complete Writings, supra note 1, at 1.
35. See Gaustad, supra note 5, at 69.
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anonymously, everyone knew he was the author. While initially
the book was publicly burned, it later caught on, attracting great
attention.38 The book made Williams' reputation in matters of
religion. He was a famous man in London, author of two well-re-
garded books, Key and Bloody Tenent.37
With his charter in hand, Roger Williams returned to the New
World, arriving in Boston on September 17, 1644. Armed with a
letter of safe passage from Parliament, Williams made his way
through Massachusetts, returning in triumph to Rhode Island.
"The news of his arrival had preceded him, and at Seekonk the
inhabitants of Providence met him with a fleet of fourteen canoes,
to welcome his return and convey him in triumph to his home."38
This may well have been his greatest moment.
The several towns of Providence Plantations gathered to form
a new government, based on the charter, which it did in May 1647,
in Portsmouth. The framers adopted a democratic form of govern-
ment, a legal system based on English law, and concluded their
compact with the memorable words "all men may walk as their
consciences persuade them, every one in the name of God."39
In 1645, Roger Williams again preserved peace among native
tribes and prevented war with the settlers. In 1649, he was chosen
Deputy President of the colony, but declined. 4° In November 1651,
he again traveled to London with his great friend, the Baptist John
Clarke, to confirm the Rhode Island charter by Parliament after
the beheading of Charles I. During this visit, he again used the
occasion to publish three of his works, in 1652. The Bloody Tenent
Yet More Bloody41 was a response to Cotton's reply to his Bloody
Tenent. The Hireling Ministry None of Christs42 was rushed into
print to influence the English debate over religious freedom, ad-
36. See id. at 85.
37. See Miller, supra note 19, at 101. Also published at this time in 1644, in
London, were Cotton's Letter Examined, supra note 1, and Roger Williams, Que-
ries of Highest Consideration (Reuben Aldridge Guild ed., 1867) (1644) [hereinaf-
ter Queries], reprinted in 2 Complete Writings, supra note 1, at 251.
38. Guild, supra note 5, at 42.
39. Id. at 42-43.
40. See id. at 43.
41. Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody (Samuel L. Caldwell
ed., 1870) (1652) [hereinafter Yet More Bloody], reprinted in 4 Complete Writings,
supra note 1, at 1.
42. Roger Williams, The Hireling Ministry None of Christs (1652) [hereinafter
Hireling], reprinted in 7 Complete Writings, supra note 1, at 147.
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dressed especially to Cromwell. Finally, he published Experiments
of Spiritual Life and Health,43 addressed to his wife to console and
aid her in matters concerning spiritual life. With his previous pub-
lication of Key, in 1643, and correspondence with John Cotton, in
1644, and Bloody Tenent, in 1644, Williams' reputation, especially
in the Old World, but also in the New, was secure. Thus, when
these later works came out, they had a ready reception.
Williams stayed in London over two years, supervising the
publication of his work, engaging in the debates of the day, and
visiting with friends. He especially enjoyed the hospitality of
Henry Vane, and became quite friendly with Cromwell, John
Milton, and other leading figures. 44 Williams was conversant in
Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, and Dutch. He taught Milton
Dutch; Milton refreshed Williams' knowledge of Hebrew, Greek,
and Latin. He made a strong impression in learned circles, as well
he should; after all, he was one of them, a sophisticated English-
man.45 With his literary accomplishments, and elite circle of
friends, he was riding high.46
While away, Providence had again fallen into disunity and
rancor, if not anarchy.47 In this context he composed his famous
Letter to the Town of Providence,48 expressing his "ideal of a rea-
sonable society in the wilderness."49 The letter had some effect on
moderating the passions of the community, and played a role in his
election as President, an office he held for over three years.
43. Roger Williams, Experiments of Spiritual Life and Health (1652) [herein-
after Experiments], reprinted in 7 Complete Writings, supra note 1, at 45.
44. In fact, Williams could have pursued a closer relationship with Cromwell,
if not for his rigid and purist views and his disinclination to hone or apply political
skills. Cromwell and the Independent clergy, such as John Owen, could easily
have embraced him, or he them, had Williams been more willing to align himself
with such tolerationists. The Parliament of the time was rife with discussion
about the direction of religion in England. See Miller, supra note 19, at 192-93.
45. See Gaustad, supra note 5, at 62; Guild, supra note 5, at 43-44.
46. See Miller, supra note 19, at 167.
47. Stable government was difficult to achieve in Rhode Island. Since the col-
ony was established on liberty of conscience, law and order had to be founded on a
basis other than religion. The settlers were fiercely independent and divergent in
religious and political views. There was a constant threat of attack from Indians
and, also, from the neighboring colonies of Massachusetts and Connecticut. More-
over, there was a fierce rivalry among the towns of Newport, Portsmouth, Provi-
dence, and Warwick. See Hall, supra note 12, at 476.
48. Letter from Roger Williams to the Town of Providence (August 1654), re-
printed in Miller, supra note 19, at 221.
49. Id.
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With the end of his presidency, Williams, now in his fifties,
slowly withdrew from public life. He still rose to the occasion, how-
ever, when the need arose. In 1670, he addressed a famous letter
to John Mason, an old acquaintance, to help quell a dispute be-
tween Rhode Island and Connecticut over Rhode Island's western
border.50 His last major event was a debate with Quakers, over
religious doctrine, held over three days in Newport and Provi-
dence. This he published, in 1676, as George Fox Digg'd Out of His
Burrowes.51 George Fox was the only book he published in
America. He died in 1683, at age eighty-four.
While alive, Roger Williams was widely considered "rigid,"
"turbulent," and "boisterous."52 Today, however, we associate Wil-
liams with freedom of conscience. This, his fundamental idea, be-
came a foundation for the country. Less well known, his religious
thought also included respect for other consciences, resulting in
equality of faith and toleration, freedom to worship, and the
nonestablishment of a national church. These ideas formed the ba-
sis on which he founded Rhode Island as a religious haven. He
was, undoubtedly, the deepest American thinker on church and
state in the period before the Constitution. Beyond this, Roger
Williams speaks to us today as a man who sought to protect the
inviolability of his soul amidst the challenges of his world, which
were quite formidable.53 Part 11 turns to an elaboration of Wil-
liams' ideas.
II. THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF ROGER WILLIAMS
Roger Williams was an obstinate man in thought, and in per-
son. He had a core set of religious beliefs, which he advocated con-
sistently over his life, with tenacity, passion, and commitment.
His philosophy never waned, from the appearance of his first major
religious works, Bloody Tenent and Queries in 1644, to his last,
George Fox, in 1676. His writing is sometimes difficult to pene-
50. See Letter from Roger Williams to Major John Mason (June 22, 1670), re-
printed in Miller, supra note 19, at 227.
51. Roger Williams, George Fox Digg'd Out of His Burrowes (Rev. J. Lewis
Diman ed., 1872) (1676) [hereinafter George Fox], reprinted in 5 Complete Writ-
ings, supra note 1, at 1.
52. Guild, supra note 5, at 47. Cotton thought Williams "self-pleasing," "self-
willed," and a "haberdasher of small questions." Miller, supra note 19, at 165.
53. Consider that Williams had to found a new society, while under constant
threat, and fight serious doctrinal and political challenges.
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trate. Written feverishly, often hurriedly, his arguments do not
unfold logically, the grammar is often poor, the style dense.54 Yet,
by deciphering his language, somewhat like he once did of Native
Americans, the originality of his thought may be uncovered.
His philosophy is clear: liberty of conscience is an indissoluble
aspect of being human because it is a person's medium to commu-
nicate with God; therefore, it is sacred. No forced intrusion is per-
missible since to persecute conscience is to violate God's work.
That argument, phrased from the theological perspective of Roger
Williams, formed a basis for the liberty of conscience enshrined in
the First Amendment protections of religion. Significantly, Roger
Williams articulated these thoughts on conscience some fifty years
before John Locke55 and about 150 years before James Madison's
famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments [hereinafter Memorial]56 and the framing of the First
Amendment.
Yet, while freedom of conscience was the central principle of
Roger Williams, it was not the only part of his religious philosophy,
nor his only contribution to American thought. Since conscience
was inviolable, a person, acting officially or privately, had essen-
tially no choice when faced with an act of conscience: one person
must respect the conscience of another. In Williams' view, this was
a means to protect the integrity of religion, and preserve social
peace. Moreover, this idea extended to all people. There was an
equality of status in matters of faith and conscience. This idea of
toleration amidst diversity too has become a foundation for Ameri-
can thought.57
54. See Miller, supra note 19, at 101, 103. One historian observes that
sentences were without predicate, the syntax defies analysis. See Morgan, supra
note 7, at 4. "At its worst, Williams' prose is tangled and convoluted. At its best, it
is dense and exhilarating. But only rarely is it ever crystal clear." Glenn W. La-
Fantasie, Roger Williams: The Inner and Outer Man, 16 Canadian Rev. Am. Stud.
375, 379 (1985).
55. See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in Treatise of Civil Gov-
ernment and A Letter Concerning Toleration (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1965).
56. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 63-72 (1947) (quoting
Memorial).
57. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992). "To endure the speech of
false ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning how to live
in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open discourse towards the end
of a tolerant citizenry." Id.
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Williams did not leave these ideas to depend on their innate
attraction to adherents. His life had taught him the dark side of
human nature. Thus, other precautions were necessary, he
learned. This led him to think deeply upon the role of government
in relation to religion, yielding an institutional strategy. His most
famous strategy was separation: to protect the garden of religion
from the "[w]ilderness of the world."58 This strand of thought
formed the evangelical influence on the nonestablishment strategy
of the First Amendment that complemented the more secular theo-
ries of Madison and, especially, Jefferson. Here too, Williams did
not rely on one strategy. Beyond separation, Williams argued to
distinguish religion from government by identifying their respec-
tive characteristics and natural jurisdictions; a separation of func-
tions argument later advocated by Madison.5 9 Moreover, he
argued against the establishment of a national church, reasoning
from his experiences with forced orthodoxy in Old England and
New England.
These are the main ideas of Roger Williams, which this Part II
will examine. These ideas, interestingly, can be grouped into strat-
egies of individual and institutional protection for religious free-
dom. Individual protections are those of conscience and tolerance.
Institutional protections include separation, different jurisdictions
for church and state, and the nonestablishment of national
churches. This Part will discuss Williams' ideas in this order.
A. Individual Protections of Religious Freedom
1. Cause of Conscience
Roger Williams learned the cause of conscience firsthand,
through many painful experiences, including, most prominently,
his banishment from Massachusetts Bay. Williams saw this as
payment for his acts of conscience. 60 This searing experience was
the defining event of his life.
His philosophy bloomed in the pivotal year 1644, while in
London securing a charter for Rhode Island. Three important
works were published, in London, that dealt with religious freedom
and cause of conscience: Cotton's Letter Examined, Queries, and
58. Cotton's Letter Examined, supra note 1, at 392.
59. See infra note 195.
60. See Miller, supra note 19, at 94. Cotton saw Williams as a heretic.
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Bloody Tenent. Each of these served a different purpose. Cotton's
Letter Examined allowed Williams to respond to Cotton over his
banishment, thereby introducing the theme of cause of conscience
to Londoners. 61 In Queries, Williams addressed Parliament over
its argument on religious freedom, hoping to influence that de-
bate.62 Bloody Tenent, released anonymously, responded to Cot-
ton's philosophy, point by point, and advocated further the cause of
conscience to Parliament. 63
"I plead the cause of truth and innocency against the bloody
doctrine of persecution for the cause of conscience" asserts Wil-
liams in Bloody Tenent,64 which best encapsulates his argument.
By "persecution for the cause of conscience," Williams means that
it is "spiritual rape"65 to coerce people to faiths or beliefs they do
not voluntarily subscribe to. It is, for example, "a spiritual rape
[to] force the consciences of all to one worship,"66 or "to batter down
idolatry, false worship, [or] heresy, [with] ... weapons [such as]...
stocks, whips, prisons, [or] swords."67 Such "Soule or Spiritual
61. Cotton and Williams had a long history. Each started out in English par-
ishes quite close to one another, before emigrating to America. In Massachusetts
Bay, of course, Cotton was the leader Williams most held responsible for his ban-
ishment. Cotton tried to explain the reasons for Williams' banishment in a letter
to Williams, which "mysteriously" appeared, in print, in London during Williams
stay abroad. It does not appear that Williams was responsible for publishing the
letter. Conveniently, however, Cotton's letter served to provide Williams with a
ready audience for his Cotton's Letter Examined, which appeared four days before
Queries.
62. The main split was between Presbyterians and Independents, who Wil-
liams admonished to "refrain from cutting each other's throats" and also of
Catholics, who "should be tolerated." Miller, supra note 19, at 80.
63. Everyone knew Williams was the author. See id. at 101. It may have been
courageous, or foolish, for Williams to address Parliament, since Parliament was
controlled by Presbyterians, who, he thought, later caused the book to be burned.
See id. at 102. Yet, the English debate over religion was complicated, involving
many strands, and Williams' purpose seemed as much to influence the debate in
England generally, including among circles outside Parliament, especially among
the Puritan and Independent groups. See id. at 101-02, Williams continued these
themes his whole life. For example, in 1652, he published Hireling, which was
designed to influence Cromwell over freedom. Williams, and others, had a mea-
sure of success in these efforts, as many people "arrived at conclusions as radical
as Williams'." Id. at 193.
64. Id. at 109 (quoting from an excerpt of Bloody Tenent).
65. Id. at 83 (quoting from an excerpt of Queries).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 131 (quoting from an excerpt of Bloody Tenent).
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Rape" is worse than "to force and ravish the Bodies of all the Wo-
men in the World."68
At the root of this cry for conscience lie several premises inte-
gral to his thought. First, and for Williams foremost, conscience is
a gift of God, God's voice within man. As such, conscience forms
our path to God. Through conscience, genuine acts of faith may
occur. It is the basis by which one becomes a true believer, finding
one's path to salvation. For such believers, as Williams, faith is a
matter of obligation to divine grace.69 For Williams, there is no
real choice in this; conscience is your duty to God, and your guide
in life. The freedom envisioned is the freedom to do God's will.
This freedom is preeminently rooted in religious belief, a spiritual-
ity emanating from God, not man. This is what Williams means by
"soul liberty." These thoughts form a justification both for the pur-
pose and importance of religion.
Second, "conscience... [is] a persuasion fixed in the mind and
heart of man, which enforceth him to judge... and to do so and so
with respect to God, His worship."70 As such, conscience is an in-
dispensable, constitutive aspect of being human. For a believer,
like Williams, it is the soul of man. "This conscience is found in all
mankind, more or less: in Jews, Turks, Papists, Protestants, pa-
gans."71 Conscience is a universal element of the human condition.
68. Bloody Tenent, supra note 34, at 182. Williams considered the idea of
persecution as "the deflowering of chaste soules." Id. at 60. Williams further felt
forcing worship was a "ten thousand fold" greater sin than for "a natural Father
[to] force his daughter, or the Father of the Commonweal[th] [to] force all the
maydens in a Country to the marriage beds of such and such men whom they can-
not love." Id. at 259.
69. Williams was a Calvinist. Calvin "defined conscience as knowledge (scien-
tia) accompanied by a sense of divine justice, and added 'it is a kind of medium
between God and man.'" Morgan, supra note 7, at 130 (quoting 2 Institutes of the
Christian Religion 75 (John Allen trans., 1732)). Such notion of conscience was at
the center of Puritan theology. For Puritans, conscience "represented the voice of
God in man ... the source of natural knowledge of God's will by which man as
originally created could have known what was right and wrong." Id. Thus, since
conscience was divine, man must respect it, whether it was right or wrong. See id.
Williams subscribed, in essence, to this thinking. So, in actuality, he was more of a
standard Puritan thinker, in this respect, than seems generally appreciated. See
id. at 133.
70. Letter from Roger Williams to Major Endicot, Governor of Massachusetts
(August 1651) [hereinafter Letter to Endicot), reprinted in Miller, supra note 19, at
158, 159.
71. Id.; see also Morgan, supra note 7, at 133-34 (stating that every man has a
conscience).
19991 ROGER WILLIAMS' GIFT 443
Yet, while conscience is universal, men and women guided by con-
science are rare.7 2
Third, for these reasons, intrusion into conscience is a serious
affront to religious liberty and, also, to human dignity. From a
religious standpoint, persecution is an unchristian, unreligious
act.73 Since conscience is the medium of communication between
God and man, its violation infringes on God's domain. No true
church would deny believers the ability to practice their faith. Any
religion that benefits from force over faith is not a true religion. 74
Moreover, since a religious conversion must involve an actual
change of heart, Williams denied that "the Arm of Flesh" or the
"Sword of Steel" could ever "reach to cut the darkness of the Mind,
the hardness and unbelief of Heart, and kindly operate upon a
Souls affections to forsake a long continued Fathers worship, and
to embrace a new, though the best and truest."75 Persecution could
only force worship, causing hypocrisy in belief.76
There is a related human rights component to this too, which
Williams recognized. People are "[not] for their conscience and
72. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 133-34.
73. "[I]f thou huntest any for cause of conscience, how canst thou say thou
followest the Lamb of God who so abhorred that practice?" Miller, supra note 19,
at 109 (quoting an excerpt of Bloody Tenent); see also Bloody Tenent, supra note
34, at 425 (noting persecution is "most evidently and lamentably contrary to the
doctrine of Christ Jesus the Prince of Peace.").
74. "IThat Religion cannot be true which needs such instruments of violence
to uphold it." Bloody Tenent, supra note 34, at 139. There was a related institu-
tional aspect to Williams' argument against persecution. History, Williams be-
lieved, showed that force favored orthodox, but false, religion. Thus, force
smothered "true" religion. True believers were invariably the objects of state per-
secution. Williams' argument against persecution is, one can see, actually a way to
protect dissenting and minority views, such as Williams' brand of separatism. See
Morgan, supra note 7, at 141 (discussing Williams' view that the exercise of con-
science, free of force, was the only process by which one could reach the true God).
75. Bloody Tenent, supra note 34, at 354; see also Hall, supra note 12, at 470
(noting Williams' idea of religious conversion was more a change of one's heart and
soul rather than a mere "mental reorientation.").
76. "[Florc't Worshpp stincks in Gods Nostrills." Hall, supra note 12, at 470
(quoting Letter from Roger Williams to Major John Mason and Governor Thomas
Prence (June 22, 1670), reprinted in 2 The Correspondence of Roger Williams 617
(Glenn W. LaFantasie ed., 1988)). It "may make.., a whole Nation of Hypocrites."
Bloody Tenent, supra note 34, at 136. Moreover, such hypocrisy could have the
"further, tragic consequence," as Professor Hall notes, of "harden[ing]" people's
souls "in a dreadful sleep and dream of their own blessed estate, and [sending]
millions of souls to hell in a secure expectation of a false salvation." Hall, supra
note 12, at 470-71 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
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religion... [to) be choked and smothered, but suffered to breathe
and walk upon the decks in the air of civil liberty and conversation
in the ship of the commonwealth, upon good assurance given of
civil obedience to the civil state."77 Forbearance of violence to
cause of conscience should, therefore, be laid "as the Magna Charta
of the highest liberties .... " 78 The "civil state is bound before God
to take off that bond and yoke of soul-oppression and to proclaim
free and impartial liberty to all the people ... ."79 Through such
liberty, Williams posited that civil peace might be secured. "I af-
firm that that state policy and state necessity which (for the peace
of the state and preventing of rivers of civil blood) permits the con-
sciences of men will be found to agree most punctually with the
rules of the best politician that ever the world saw .. ."80 For
these reasons, it follows that application of force to conscience con-
stitutes "spiritual rape"81-what Williams called "the bloody
tenent."
2
A final point on conscience goes to Williams' description of its
reach. In contemporary terms, this involves ascertaining the
boundaries, if any, of free exercise of religion. One important theo-
retical question is answered quickly. Matters of conscience extend
beyond questions of belief. "By persecution for cause of conscience,
I... mean either for professing some point of doctrine which you
believe in conscience to be the truth, or for practicing some work
which you believe conscience to be a religious duty."8 3 For Roger
77. Miller, supra note 19, at 140 (quoting from an excerpt of Bloody Tenent).
78. Id. at 144.
79. Id. at 204 (quoting from an excerpt of Hireling).
80. Id. at 135 (quoting from an excerpt of Bloody Tenent).
81. Id. at 83 (quoting from an excerpt of Queries). "Only let it be their souls
choice, and no inforcing Sword, but what is spiritual in their spiritual causes."
Hireling supra note 42, at 154.
82. Miller, supra note 19, at 143 (quoting from an excerpt of Bloody Tenent)
IThe blood of souls compelled and forced to hypocrisy in a spiritual
and soul rape, so deeply guilty of the blood of the souls under the alter,
persecuted in all ages for the cause of conscience, and so destructive to the
civil peace and welfare of all kingdoms, countries, and commonwealths.
Id. All men hate persecution.
83. Id. at 114 (quoting from an excerpt of Bloody Tenent). Williams, through
the character of Truth, goes on to say:
I desire it may be well observed that this distinction is not full and
complete: for besides this, that a man may be persecuted because he
holdeth or practiceth what he believes in conscience to be a truth .... I
say besides this, a man may also be persecuted because he dares not be
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Williams, it is clear that conscience encompasses both belief ("pro-
fessing some point of doctrine which you believe in conscience to be
the truth") and action ("practicing some work which you believe in
conscience to be a religious duty").
Matters of belief are pretty straightforward. These are the in-
ward directed acts of conscience, constituting peoples' communica-
tion with God. According to Williams, this involves "professing
some point of doctrine." For example, in Yet More Bloody, Wil-
liams identified as persecutions for cause of conscience fines, whip-
pings, and banishments on account of belief,84 punishing people for
not attending church,8 5 withdrawal of civil privileges because of
belief,8 6 and requiring to support with taxes a religion or worship
in which one does not believe.8 7
The reach of actions (or work) is less clear. The best evidence
of what Williams means by conscience-based acts is his famous
1655 Letter to the Town of Providence,s8 known as the Ship of State
Letter, where he addresses the citizens of the colony, some of whom
were rebelling against the town's attempt to establish a regular
militia. In the letter, Williams analogizes a commonwealth to a
ship at sea.8 9 "[Bloth Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks,
may be embarked in one ship."90 Thus, for these and all people,
"none... be forced to come to the ship's prayers or worship, nor
compelled from their own particular prayers or worship, if they
constrained to yield obedience to such doctrines and worships as are by
men invented and appointed.
Id.
84. Yet More Bloody, supra note 41, at 85.
85. See id. at 59.
86. See id. at 414.
87. See id. at 301-04, 366; see also Hall, supra note 12, at 473 (citing same).
88. See Letter to the Town of Providence (January 1655) [hereinafter Ship of
State Letter], reprinted in Miller, supra note 19, at 225. The letter appears to have
arisen out of the colony's attempt, in 1654, to establish a militia. Some residents
objected to compulsory military service, at least partially on religious grounds. It
is unclear whether the dissenters were advocating a conscience-based exemption
from military service or a more general exemption from civil punishment. Since
the latter position might result in civil anarchy, it would make Williams' response
more understandable. See Hall, supra note 12, at 485.
89. "There goes many a ship to sea, with many hundred souls in one ship,
whose weal and woe is common, and is a true picture of a commonwealth or a
human combination or society." Ship of State Letter, supra note 88, at 225 (foot-
note omitted).
90. Id. at 225-26.
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practice any."91 This definition of conscience reveals again the core
of Williams' belief that a person must have the ability to believe
and practice the person's faith-both affirmatively in the way one
chooses and, negatively, as protection against compulsion. This
definition accords substantially with his view in Bloody Tenent.s2
"[N]otwithstanding this liberty," Williams asserts further in
the Ship of State Letter:
[Tihe commander of this ship ought to command the ship's
course, yea, and also command that justice, peace, and sobri-
ety be kept and practiced, both among the seamen and all the
passengers. If any of the seamen refuse to perform their serv-
ices, or passengers to pay their freight; if any refuse to help,
in person or purse, towards the common charges or defense; if
any refuse to obey the common laws and orders of the ship
concerning their common peace or preservation if any shall
mutiny and rise up against their commanders and officers; if
any should preach or write that there ought to be no com-
manders or officers because all are equal in Christ ... I say
... the commander or commanders may judge, resist, compel,
and punish such transgressors according to their deserts and
merits.93
This passage indicates that there are limits, in Williams' view, to
liberty of conscience. That liberty must be compatible with civil
peace. Stated differently, religion may not threaten "common
peace or preservation."94
At first glance, this would appear to be a constrictive view of
religious freedom, calling, as it does, for limiting freedom to "com-
mon laws and orders." Certainly there was some justification for
this. The small colony of Rhode Island was under threat by its
larger neighbors, Massachusetts and Connecticut. The "common
defense" and "preservation" was, in fact, at issue, requiring all res-
91. Id. at 226.
92. See Miller, supra note 19, at 114. "By persecution for cause of conscience, I
... mean either for professing some point of doctrine which you believe in con-
science to be the truth, or for practicing some work which you believe in conscience
to be religious duty." Id. (quoting from an excerpt of Bloody Tenent).
93. Ship of State Letter, supra note 88, at 226.
94. Id. The letter clearly reveals Williams' commitment to the Puritan idea
that government should enforce morality. As Professor Morgan observes, Wil-
liams' idea of liberty of conscience exists within the context of the magistrate's
duty "to punish anyone whose conscience led him to undertake actions against the
public safety and welfare." Morgan, supra note 7, at 134.
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idents to do their part. There is also evidence that the letter, writ-
ten toward the end of Williams' life, reflected his disillusionment
about finding real truth in life.95
Yet, a closer look at the passage indicates that it may have
been meant in a more freedom enhancing way. First, the passage
reveals Williams' philosophy of trying to delineate the boundaries
of religion from civil jurisdiction as a means of protecting religion
and securing civil peace.9 6 Belief in religion did not entitle one to
violate the social order. Second, the reach of conscience must be
measured against the "commands of justice and peace," particu-
larly "the common laws and orders of the ship concerning their
common peace or preservation." At a minimum, this would seem
to call for some justification that a claim of "common peace or pres-
ervation" is weightier, in the circumstances, than a claim of con-
science.97 Certainly not every "common law" would meet that
standard. Moreover, the context of the letter-threat to war and
disorder-demonstrates the easy case for "common defense."
There is also evidence that Williams did not like the Quakers'
display of nakedness in public, which Quakers believed their inner
light directed them to do as a way of symbolizing the spiritual state
of divergent believers. 98 Public nudity, for Williams, was deeply
95. According to Perry Miller, the letter evidenced Williams' deepening sense
of the gulf between the "perfection of the antitypical church and the miserable
reality of the wilderness." Miller, supra note 19, at 225.
96. The philosophy of separating religion from society as a means of protecting
both from one another will be discussed. See infra notes at 127-43. In fact, Profes-
sor Hall observes, "a more convincing explanation of the letter.., is that Williams
simply chose a metaphor which-although powerful-was an imperfect analogy
with which to elaborate his broader views about civil duty and religious conscience,
and that his letter failed to address a host of unanswered questions about the sub-
ject." Timothy L. Hall, Separating Church and State 109 (1998) (footnote omitted).
97. Roger Williams did not speak directly to this issue in his time. It is diffi-
cult to apply his ideas to current free exercise controversies.
98. The Quakers provoked the outrage of authorities, on both sides of the At-
lantic, through their radical, even bizarre, behavior. It was their practice, for ex-
ample, to interrupt church services to testify against false worship. Thus, the
authorities of New England, and England, strove to insulate their jurisdictions
from the influence of Quakers. Led by Massachusetts, the colonies of the region
passed legislation prohibiting Quakers from entering their territory. Those juris-
dictions also expelled and punished those Quakers who did venture into their do-
main, and censored and banned their books. For these reasons, these colonies
feared Rhode Island, which extended refuge to Quakers, as all groups, believing
that the contagion would effect the whole region. This also fortified the New Eng-
land colonies' view of Rhode Island as aberrant. See Curry, supra note 10, at 21.
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offensive, betraying perhaps his Puritan background. 99 From this
we might more clearly ascertain another outer limit on religious
practice. Public nudity, or similar conduct threatening public
peace (in the Puritan world-view), such as uncleanliness or immod-
esty,100 is not justified, even by religious conviction. Williams also
condemned human sacrifice. 1° 1 Law and order, thus, again comes
into bold relief as a limit to religion.
Given that Williams does not look favorably on threats to law
and order, it seems reasonable to conclude that current controver-
sies, such as the smoking of peyote 10 2 or the sacrifice of animals, 03
would likely not fare well under Williams' view. Such hard ques-
tions are not, obviously, addressed by Williams. Nor are other
ones regularly encountered by the Supreme Court--questions like
littering on the street, 10 4 proselytizing, 0 5 or exemption from gen-
eral laws. 06
99. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 135.
100. See Roger Williams, The Examiner Defended (1652), reprinted in 7 Com-
plete Writings, supra note 1, at 195, 243.
101. See id.
102. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).
103. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993).
104. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
105. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
106. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). In American free exer-
cise law, a serious debate has been over whether protection covers matters of belief
only, or also extends to faith-based acts. Initially, the Court, in Reynolds confined
First Amendment protection to matters of belief. The Court reasoned, under the
First Amendment:
Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subver-
sive of good order. Laws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices.
Id. at 164, 166; accord Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04 (stating the Free Exercise
Clause "embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society.") (citing Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145).
It took over 100 years for the Court to extend definitive protection to acts of
faith too. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court recognized that a
law that conditioned receipt of unemployment benefits on a willingness to work
Saturdays, which the claimant asserted violated her beliefs, "forces her [the claim-
ant] to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits,
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From Williams' view, it is perhaps not so surprising that he
did not address these matters in detail. In his time, it was a seri-
ous and risky battle to fight over acts of faith, as evidenced by his
own life experiences. The establishment of the Providence colony
itself as a place of toleration and freedom of religion was the west-
ern world's first experiment with the idea of whether liberty of con-
science could coexist with civil peace. Thus, we can see clearly that
Williams was addressing foundational questions of religious free-
dom: conscience as a freedom comes before protection of faith-
based actions.
Furthermore, Williams had a dim view of Roman Catholics,
whom he feared, as most Protestants did, as revolutionary ele-
ments because of the perception that their allegiance was to a for-
eign sovereign, the Pope.' 07 Because of this fear, there is evidence
that Williams suggested that catholics be "disarmed and required
to wear distinctive clothing" to facilitate their ready identifica-
tion.108 He similarly thought Quakers' disdain for authority a
threat to the state.10 9 Nevertheless, for both Catholics and
Quakers, Williams advocated liberty of conscience, notwithstand-
ing his worries, as, indeed, he did for all. He called for suppression
of their "incivil" behavior, but not their worship." 0
A final piece of evidence bearing on the question of the scope of
conscience is freedom of thought. Williams limited liberty of con-
science to religious conviction, not the broader category of freedom
of inquiry. Thus, religious conscience was what he founded as invi-
olable, not conscience generally."' In fact, Williams believed in
suppression of speech to the extent it threatened the social or-
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand." Id. at 404.
Recently, however, in the controversial Employment Div., Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, the Court appears to have rejected faith-based acts
when they conflict with a general law. In Smith, the Court declined to extend free
exercise protection to religiously inspired peyote use because drug use conflicted
with general criminal prohibitions.
107. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 136-37.
108. Id. To place Williams' concerns in perspective, John Locke, by compari-
son, did not extend religious freedom to Catholics. See Hall, supra note 12, at 493
(citing John Locke).
109. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 137.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 136.
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der. 112 Thus, we can see clearly that Williams was an evangelical,
not a son of the Enlightenment. A summary of Roger Williams'
views on conscience now seems in order.
2. Summary on Conscience
Through Williams' assertion and elaboration of "the cause of
conscience" we can see the foundation of our religious freedom.
First, conscience forms our path to God. It is, therefore, the es-
sence of religion itself, revealing, as it does, the soul of man and his
communication with God. This idea provides a strong justification
for treating religion as a special activity meriting preferred treat-
ment in the social order. Second, being rooted in human character
and divine communication, conscience is an inviolable aspect of be-
ing human. These two foundations form a strong justification for
the treatment of conscience as a human right. Third, the essence
of conscience is protection against persecution and coercion. Com-
pulsion of conscience is contrary to the law of God and the natural
law of man. Fourth, conscience involves matters of belief plus mat-
ters of action, although it is difficult to say exactly how far the
scope of each extends. We can conclude, however, that religiously
motivated conduct is limited by the need for law and order,
although the precise line between the two remains elusive. These
thoughts are Williams' main contributions to our concept of reli-
gious liberty. But they are not his only thoughts on religion, as the
next sections attest.
3. Tolerance
The idea of tolerance follows from Williams' conception of con-
science. Since conscience is inviolable, the proper course, when
faced with an act of conscience, is to allow the person his or her
choice. All people possess conscience. 1 3 Therefore, all people are
entitled to their views, whether one agrees or disagrees with them.
Williams certainly disagreed with the religious views of many in
his lifetime. Yet, he extended religious toleration to them. The
idea of tolerance extends to "Indians ... French, Dutch, Spanish,
Persians, Turks, [and] Jews... [all of whom] should.., be permit-
112. See id.
113. "I speak of conscience, a persuasion fixed in the mind and heart of man,
which enforceth him to judge . . .and to do so and so with respect to God, His
worship." Letter to Endicot, supra note 70, at 159.
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ted in their worships if correspondent in civil obedience ....- 114
From this it follows that tolerance is the only proper response to
the universal assertion of conscience.
For his time, if not, indeed, our time, Roger Williams framed a
remarkably broad, and inclusive, freedom of religion, extending its
protections to all believers, Christian and non-Christian. This
foreshadowed the tolerance that would be necessary for the emerg-
ing pluralism of the New World. This can best be seen against the
struggles of the Old World. In the England of his time, a civil war
was raging over, among other issues, religion. With the establish-
ment of the Stuart dynasty, signaled by James I accession to the
throne in 1603, Protestant England feared the restoration of Ca-
tholicism. This flared into outright civil war during the reign of
Charles I, ending in his beheading. Protestants distrusted
Catholics, fearing them as "dual citizens" with the superior claim
being to church and not to state. In continental Europe, the Thirty
Years War, which lasted from 1618-1648, ending in the Treaty of
Westphalia, was also fought over religion, as Catholics strove to
contain the revolution of Protestantism. 1 15
In this contentious climate, Williams wrote his major religious
works, calling for liberty of conscience and tolerance. 1 6 In his
time, especially notable were his calls for tolerance concerning
Catholics and Native Americans, although the same might be said
for Jews 117 and Turks. 118 In Queries, Williams called for tolerance
on behalf of Catholics amidst the English civil war, and amidst the
114. Id. at 139 (quoting from an excerpt of Bloody Tenent). In his Ship of State
Letter, supra note 88, at 225-26, Williams phrased the idea of tolerance as follows:
"Papists and Protestants, Jews and Turks . .. [are all entitled to] liberty of
conscience."
115. In Miinster, the capitol of Westphalia, the Anabaptists, forerunner of the
American Baptists, took over the town, a Catholic stronghold, in 1534. See Gaus-
tad, supra note 5, at 3. When the Catholics retook the town, they hung the leaders
of the Anabaptists from the main church steeple. Thus, the Old World suffered
tremendous religious wars.
116. "[W]e query how with comfort to your souls you may encourage the Eng-
lish treasure to be exhausted, and the English blood to be spilt for the cause of
Christ?" Miller, supra note 19, at 84 (quoting from Queries).
117. Rhode Island was the first haven for Jews in America, as for many faiths.
This resulted in the founding of the country's first Jewish synagogue, the Tauro
Synagogue, in Newport. See Curry, supra note 10, at 90-91.
118. The Turks' domination of eastern and central Europe spanned a century,
ending at Vienna, in 1530, with the defeat of the Ottoman army. Turks certainly
were severely discriminated against in Europe.
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doctrinal battle in Protestantism between Presbyterians (Angli-
cans) and Independents, such as Williams. 119 Similarly impres-
sive was his embrace of Native Americans, who were regarded by
most English settlers as barbarians. Most settlers warred with In-
dians. Williams tried to understand them and be their friend. For
Williams, all consciences-"a rightly informed conscience, or a
blind and erroneous conscience"'12 0-are entitled to have their way.
Williams was doctrinaire on matters of religion, but tolerant of
others' beliefs. He was dogmatic in religion, but civil and tolerant
in society.
Viewed from Williams' theological perspective, the world could
be divided between true believers (such as Williams) and all
others. The church of true believers was voluntary and small.121
Outside of this church, were all others: English, Spanish, Euro-
pean, non-European, Catholic, Protestant, Turk, and Jew. Euro-
pean civilization was not superior to Native American. All were
equal. None were better than others. Equality, respect and tolera-
tion were the tools of civil discourse. "I plead for Impartiality and
equal freedom, peace, and safety to other Consciences and Assem-
blies, unto which the people may as freely goe, and this according to
each conscience, what conscience soever this conscience be (not
transgressing against Civilities) whether of Jews or Gentile."122
Williams' views on toleration find, fittingly, resonance in the
work of John Locke, who wrote on this in his famous A Letter Con-
cerning Toleration in 1689, some fifty years after Williams. 123
Madison too thought deeply about these ideas in the period leading
119. "We query (if security may be taken by the wisdom of the state for civil
subjection) why even the Papists themselves and their consciences may not be per-
mitted in the world?" Miller, supra note 19, at 84 (quoting from Queries). Perry
Miller notes that the members of Parliament must have considered Queries to be a
"weird production, asserting in the disarming form of questions that not only
should Presbyterians and Independents refrain from cutting each other's throats,
but that even Catholics should be tolerated." Id. at 80.
120. Id. at 119 (quoting from Bloody Tenent). In Williams' view, all men were
depraved before God. In such depravity, all were equal; none had a superior claim
to God.
121. For Williams, true believers were those who believed in the separatist
brand of Calvinism that Williams advocated. This church should govern its own
affairs, yet operate within the laws of civil society.
122. Hireling, supra note 42, at 164-65.
123. Locke does not attribute his ideas to Williams, nor is there any evidence
that Locke was familiar with Williams' work. See Hall, supra note 12, at 489
n.173; infra notes 189-97 and accompanying text.
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up to the framing of the First Amendment.124 Today, toleration is
a bedrock of American society. 125
There is one final and quite human lesson to be learned from
Williams' rumination on tolerance. No person is so sure (or should
be so sure) or himself or of her perception of eternal truth, so as to
justify imposing that truth on others. People who are interested in
imposing their truth on others are not interested in truth, but the
act of subjugation. 126
B. Institutional Protection of Religion
1. Separation
Having identified and advocated the essence of religion as ex-
ercise of conscience, Roger Williams next sought a way to protect
and insulate religion from the pressures and reach of the world.
His idea was separation from the world to the extent possible. Pri-
marily, the movement toward separation was a way to protect the
purity and integrity of religion from an evil, confusing world. Wil-
liams assumed that the "world lies in wickedness. . . like a wilder-
ness or a sea of wild beasts innumerable."127 Thus, religion, if it
was to remain intact, must be shielded from the corrupting influ-
ence of the world. This called for the drawing of clear lines: the
church is the garden, the world the wilderness. Williams thus
originated the evangelical strand of separation that influenced the
framing of the First Amendment religious protections, comple-
menting the more secular theories of separation of Thomas Jeffer-
son and James Madison. 128
Yet, Williams also hypothesized that separation would serve
the interests of the state. The experience of England, and even the
short experience of the New World, was that the mixing of religion
in civil matters was a source of serious discord.129 Removing
124. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
125. As put aptly by Justice Kennedy, "To endure the speech of false ideas or
offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning how to live in a pluralis-
tic society, a society which insists upon open discourse towards the end of a toler-
ant citizenry." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992).
126. See Miller, supra note 19, at 256.
127. Id. at 124 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
128. See infra notes 198-200, 212-19 and accompanying text.
129. For example, in the England of Williams' time, discord over religion was a
major factor in the English Civil War. In New England, Williams' dispute with
Cotton and other Massachusetts figures led to his banishment.
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religion from state control, therefore, would eliminate a cause of
friction. Government could function untroubled by religious dis-
putes. 130 This would allow government to concentrate on accom-
plishing its core function of promoting the common welfare and
preserving the civil peace. In short, separation was part of a two-
prong strategy. First, it was a means to maintain the purity of
religion. Second, it was a way to facilitate the way of government,
securing civil peace.
Roger Williams' most famous expression of separation was his
wall of separation statement written in Cotton's Letter Examined,
and quoted at the beginning of this article:
[Wihen they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of Sepa-
ration between the Garden of the Church and the Wilderness
of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, re-
moved the Candlestick, and made his Garden a Wilderness,
as at this day. And that ther[elfore if he will ever please to
restore his Garden and Paradise again, it must of necessity
be walled in peculiarly unto himself from the world, and that
all that shall be saved out of the world are to be transplanted
out of the Wilderness of [the] world, and added unto his
Church or Garden. 131
In this famous metaphor, separation from the world is designed to
preserve the purity of religion. Religion is for believers, who volun-
tarily practice acts of conscience as they communicate with God.
To be true to God is to be true to conscience, for in conscience every
man and woman finds revealed the eternal truth which illumi-
nates the path to heaven. Thus, fidelity to conscience is a matter of
obligation to religious conviction.
Yet, the way of God is not the way of the world. God is pure,
the "garden;" 'It~he world lies in wickedness," 132 but is also tempt-
ing. Moreover, "God's people may lawfully converse and cohabit in
cities, towns, [and), else must they not live in the world but go out
of it."133 Therefore, the best course is to guard religion from the
world, its attractions and dangers, by "it must of necessity be
walled in peculiarly unto himself from the world .... ,,1"4 At bot-
130. See Hall, supra note 12, at 482.
131. Cotton's Letter Examined, supra note 1, at 392.
132. Miller, supra note 19, at 124 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
133. Id.
134. Cotton's Letter Examined, supra note 1, at 392.
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tom, Williams conceives the wall as an institutional strategy to
protect religion from the corrupting influence of the world.
Williams' separationist strategy calls for supreme vigilance in
order to maintain what is a relatively absolute position on "sepa-
rate(ness) from the world."13 5 There must be "a separation of holy
from unholy, penitent from impenitent, godly from ungodly
...."136 Separation is the only way to build a church true to God.
"[To frame any other building upon such grounds and foundations
is no other than to raise the form of a square house upon the keel of
a ship, which will never prove a soul-saving true ark or church of
Christ Jesus according to the pattern." 137
Stated differently, since the world is the wilderness, to enter
the world is to enter the dangerous wild. A believer must, there-
fore, be on guard, and learn to keep a distance from the world. "If
the weeds be kept out of the garden of the church, the roses and
lilies therein will flourish, notwithstanding that weeds abound in
the field of the civil state."138 Maintaining the faith, moreover,
calls for vigilance. "[N]ot attending to the command of Christ
Jesus to permit the tares to grow in the field of the world, they
made the garden of the church and field of the world to be all one
"139
No person or church is so distinct, or sure of truth, that they
can remain immune from the lures of the world.140 No church can
mix with the world without exposing itself to the danger of its own
inner decay. "[Bly degrees the garden of the churches of saints
were turned into the wilderness of whole nations."141 This hap-
pened during the time of Constantine when "the whole world be-
came Christian or Christendom" as rulers sought to make "the
garden of the church and field of the world to be all one."142 Such
was "zealous mistake[s] persecut[ing] good wheat instead of
135. Id.
136. Id. at 393.
137. Miller, supra note 19, at 98-99 (quoting from Cotton's Letter Examined).
138. Id. at 137 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
139. Id. Williams expresses this same thought in different ways. "When Chris-
tianity began to be choked, it was not when Christians lodged in cold prisons, but
down-beds of ease." Id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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tares."143 This also happened in Massachusetts Bay with the at-
tempt to enforce religious orthodoxy. Any such mixing of church
and state undermines the purity of religion, in Williams' view, thus
obstructing the path to salvation.
Williams' thought has implications both for religion and gov-
ernment. For religion, separation is the means by which religion
may be nourished and maintained as pure. Religion, at bottom, is
a matter for the religious, who are best qualified to determine the
course of a church. Religion is devalued to the extent people or
forces other than the religious determine its course.
The implications for government follow from this definition of
religion. Since religion is for the believers, there is really no role
for government to play other than, perhaps, to encourage believers
to follow their conscience. Otherwise, the role of government is to
leave religion alone. Instead, government should concentrate on
performing its core function of preserving the civil peace, not the
spiritual. These thoughts on separation led Williams to think
deeply about the role of government, the role of religion, and their
coexistence, which he developed into a theory of different jurisdic-
tions for each.
2. The Different Jurisdictions of State and Religion
Having made the case that cause of conscience was the essence
of religion, and that for religion to remain pure it must be separate
from the world, Roger Williams now turned his attention to elabo-
rating a theory by which religion and government could coexist.
Williams thought deeply about both religion and government. His
thoughts on government were grounded in social contract theory,
believing that sovereignty lay with the people, and not any "divine
right of kings," and that any people, including Native Americans,
could choose the government they desire.'4
143. Id.
144. I infer that the sovereign, original, and foundation of civil power lies
in the people .... And if so, that a people may erect and establish what
form of government seems to them most meet for their civil condition. It
is evident that such governments as are by them erected and established
have no more power, nor for no longer time, than the civil power or people
consenting and agreeing shall betrust them with.
Id. at 147. Social contract theory, of course, followed from Enlightenment thought,
and was influential at this time in England. Later, in 1690, John Locke would
write his famous Two Treatises of Government. Interestingly, Williams' formation
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Williams' approach was to identify the essential attributes of
each government and religion as a way of distinguishing one from
the other. By so distinguishing the two, they could remain sepa-
rate from one another. Thus, the affairs or disputes of one would
not effect the other. The main role of government, in Williams'
view, was to preserve law and order, and promote social peace.
The main role of religion was to facilitate communication with God
so that one could find a path to salvation. For Williams, these
goals were not incompatible. For example, since government
maintained law and order, and civil peace, it created the conditions
in which religion could thrive. Similarly, since religion promoted
good morals, it encouraged people to be good citizens.
This theme is stated throughout Williams' writings, but is best
expressed in Bloody Tenent:
There is a civil sword, called the sword of civil justice, which,
being of a material civil nature, for the defense of persons,
estates families, liberties of a city or civil state, and the sup-
pressing of uncivil or injurious persons or actions by such
civil punishments-it cannot, according to its utmost reach
and capacity. . ., I say, cannot extend to spiritual and soul
causes, spiritual and soul punishment, which belongs to that
spiritual sword with two edges, the soul-piercing (in soul-sav-
ing or soul-killing), the Word of God.145
So stated, the proper role of government is to maintain civil peace,
defend life, liberty, and property, and keep law and order, includ-
ing "execut[ing] vengeance against robbers, murderers, ty-
rants,"146 and other violators of the social order. Over such civil
matters, government is entitled to use civil measures, including
of the colony of Rhode Island, in 1647, literally constituted a social contract be-
tween the original founders and newcomers. Williams' ideas on democracy cer-
tainly predated Locke's work on social contract theory. See supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text.
145. Miller, supra note 19, at 133 (quoting from Bloody Tenent); see also id. at
198 (discussing the proper role of government).
The civil sword (therefore) cannot rightfully act either in restraining
the souls of the people from worship or in constraining them to worship,
considering that there is not a title in the New Testament of Christ Jesus
that commits the forming or reforming of His spouse and church to the
civil and worldly power ....
Id. (quoting from Hireling).
146. Id. at 84 (quoting from Queries).
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"those weapons which are used by persecutors-stocks, whips,
prisons, swords, gibbets, stakes .... "147
Having defined what government can, and appropriately
should do, Williams next turns to what government cannot do. Of-
ficial power does not extend to "spiritual and soul causes," 148 af-
fairs that belong to religion, not government. "[Algainst these
spiritual strongholds in the souls of men, spiritual artillery and
weapons are proper. . ."149 Thus, the "spiritual sword" rules spir-
itual matters, not the "civil sword." 150 Over spiritual matters,
"civil weapons are improper. . . ."151 Stated differently, civil juris-
diction extends over matters involving "external peace," religious
jurisdiction covers affairs of "internal peace."152
Williams' division of function between religion and govern-
ment reflects an innovation in thought about the proper role of gov-
ernment. In denying that government had a role to play in
controlling religion, Williams was really calling for a new role for
government. He was challenging the main western thought of his
day that government, because it was divinely ordained, had the
power to carry out the divine. 153 In challenging this assumption,
Williams was not contesting the value of government. He believed
in government, and thought it had an important role to play, espe-
cially in securing peace. However, he did not think that role was
divinely instituted, nor that it included authority over religion. 54
In denying governmental authority over religion, Williams advo-
cated a cause not followed in western thought for a century or
more, when Americans took up this cause in their framing of reli-
147. Id. at 131 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
148. Id. at 133.
149. Id. at 131.
150. Id. at 133.
151. Id. at 132.
152. "[TIhe powers of the world or civil state are bound to propose external
peace in all godliness for their end, and the end of the church be to preserve inter-
nal peace in all godliness .... " Id. at 145-46.
153. The most obvious manifestation of this thought was the theory of the di-
vine right of kings and queens, by which the sovereign asserted authority over
spiritual as well as temporal matters. Coercion over the spiritual realm was part
of the sovereign's prerogative. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 64.
154. This follows from Williams' view that there were no chosen people or gov-
ernments after the ancient Israelites; therefore, there could be no national
churches.
ROGER WILLIAMS' GIFT
gious protections.1 55 Today, we take government's disability to act
on religion for granted. But, for Williams' time, this was a radical
thought.
This division of function benefitted both religion and govern-
ment. The benefits to religion are clear, as enumerated in Wil-
liams' argument for separation.' 56 But there are significant
benefits for government as well. By removing religion from gov-
ernment's jurisdiction, Williams excised a significant cause of dis-
cord in the body politic. Williams' innovation was revolutionary:
civil peace is best secured by eliminating official control of religion.
This removed persecution for cause of conscience and the inevita-
ble ill-will it bred. Furthermore, this focused attention away from
what government should do and toward the goal of what govern-
ment can do. This was a liberating innovation, because it relieved
government of the pressure to act divine.' 57 Instead, government
could address its core function of promoting the general welfare
and securing common peace.
In this manner, we can see how Williams' strategy was to in-
sulate one jurisdiction from the effects of discord or friction that
might arise in the other. Religion and government were separate,
not intertwined. Each had its own identity, purposes, and history.
This was the way toward peaceful coexistence.
Williams' division of function between religion and govern-
ment calls for precise identification of the essential attributes of
each. For Williams, the essence of religion is conscience. Thus,
conscience is the absolute barrier into which government may not
intrude, which he advocated throughout his life as persecution for
cause of conscience.' 58 Instead, a state should promote freedom of
conscience.1 59 Tolerance of conscience safeguards religious free-
155. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 89-90. Some early Separatists had edged
toward freeing religion from state control, but Williams took the decisive steps.
See id.
156. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
157. See Morgan, supra note 7, at 120. In the past, social peace was forced by
imposing a uniform faith on all.
158. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
159. "I affirm that state policy and state necessity which (for the peace of the
state and preventing of rivers of civil blood) permits the consciences of men will be
found to agree most punctually with the rules of the best politician that ever the
world saw , . . ." Miller, supra note 19, at 135 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
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dom, and removes discord from the commonwealth, thereby
preventing the spilling of "civil blood."160
Likewise, there are limits to religion if it too is to exist peace-
fully with government. The essence of civil society is the mainte-
nance of law and order. Williams was a strong proponent of law
and order, having experience with it firsthand in his founding and
administering of Rhode Island. In Williams' view, religious prac-
tices had no license to disturb civil peace. If a person or church
disturbed civil peace, civil authorities could punish such con-
duct. 161 Law and order thus constituted the limit of religious
freedom. 162
Thus, Williams' strategy on the roles of religion and govern-
ment comes into clear view. First, Williams sought to identify the
essential attributes of each. The essence of religion was con-
science; that of government law and order. Neither religion nor
government should intrude into the affairs of the other. A policy of
peaceful coexistence was thereby encouraged, one where religion
could flourish and civil peace maintained. This strategy found gen-
eral resonance in the thinking of James Madison.163 His strategy
carried with it several important cognates, especially that of dis-
couraging national churches or establishments of religion, and the
view that churches should function in society like any other
association. 164
3. No National Church
Under Williams' separationist theory, the worst offense was a
mixing of church and state. Then, the garden of the church would
turn into the wilderness of the world, and "civil blood" would spill.
There could be no worse mixture than the establishment of a na-
tional church. Williams campaigned against an officially spon-
sored or national church his whole life. Certainly this bore the
imprint of his own bitter experience. In Williams' view, his exile
160. Id.; see also id. at 143 (arguing civil peace is destroyed when a state perse-
cutes conscience).
161. See Bloody Tenent, supra note 34, at 229, 232; see also Hall, supra note 12,
at 483 (citing same).
162. A diversity of religion should "be permitted in their worships if correspon-
dent in civil obedience. .... " Miller, supra note 19, at 139 (quoting from Bloody
Tenent); accord Ship of State Letter, supra note 88.
163. See infra notes 200, 209 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
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was due to Massachusetts' union of church and state. 65 Thus,
Williams' associated national churches with persecution for cause
of conscience. Under such a national church, there was only one
path to God, the one approved by authorities. If one did not sub-
scribe to this orthodoxy, one was a "heretic," persecuted for cause
of conscience. This was Williams' own experience.
Such was also the experience of England, and Europe gener-
ally. England changed religion with monarchs.
Who knows not in how few years the commonweal[thl of Eng-
land hath set up and pulled down? The fathers made the
children heretics, and the children the fathers. How doth the
Parliament in Henry VIII his days condemn the absolute Po-
pery in Henry VII? How is in Edward VI his time the Parlia-
ment of Henry VIII condemned for their half-Popery, half-
Protestantism? How soon doth Queen Mary's Parliament
condemn Edward for his absolute Protestantism? And Eliza-
beth's Parliament as soon condemn Queen Mary's for their
absolute Popery... ? And oh! since the commonweal[th] can-
not without a spiritual rape force the consciences of all to one
worship, oh, that it may never commit that rape in forcing the
consciences of all men to one worship which a stronger arm
and sword may soon (as formerly) arise to alter.166
For Williams, this was "the sword ... mak[ing] a whole nation of
hypocrites." 167 Since, in Williams' view, establishment churches
rule by the sword, the relationship is one of power, not faith.
165. In commenting on his own banishment, Williams observed:
Secondly, if he mean this civil act of banishing, why should he call a civil
sentence from the civil state, within a few weeks' execution in so sharp a
time of New England's cold, why should he call this a banishment from
the churches except he silently confess that the frame or constitution of
their churches is implicitly national (which yet they profess against)?
Miller, supra note 19, at 94 (quoting from Cotton's Letter Examined).
166. Id. at 82-83 (quoting from Queries). For Williams, this was "after the an-
cient pattern of Nebuchadnezzar's bowing the whole world in one most solemn uni-
formity of worship to his golden image." Id. at 131 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
167. Id. at 130 (quoting from Bloody Tenent). Williams goes on to elaborate
this point:
What a most woeful proof hereof have the nations of the earth given in all
ages? And to seek no further than our native soil, within a few score of
years how many wonderful changes in religion hath the whole kingdom
made, according to the change of the governors thereof, in the several reli-
gions which they themselves embraced! Henry VII finds and leaves the
kingdom absolutely Popish. Henry VIII casts it into a mold half-Popish,
half-Protestant. Edward VI brings forth an edition all Protestant. Queen
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The most important consequence of Williams' belief in the im-
plausibility of national churches was the important argument
against establishment of religion, which has become central to
American thought. In arguing against a national church, Williams
delineated the essence of the argument against establishments.
The attributes of an establishment can thereby be identified.
The clearest example is where only one religion and one wor-
ship is commanded and permitted. 168 An example of this was the
New England Congregational Church, which resembled the Eng-
lish Church. The essential attribute is where a "people of [a] ...
nation have been forced into a national way of worship .... "169
Coercion of conscience over matters of faith and worship to offi-
cially accepted practices constitutes establishment of religion.
Perhaps the clearest definition of an establishment lies in Yet
More Bloody, where Williams draws from his own experience with
the established church of Massachusetts Bay. Through this exam-
ple, Williams saw five essential characteristics of an establish-
ment. First, government mandated that people go to "common
worship" and "holy times," required contributions to "holy Officers,"
and outlawed dissenting faiths. 170 Second, civil power supervised
"the conforming or reforming of the Church, the truth or falsehood
of the Churches, Ministries or ministrations, ordinances, Doctrine
.. ..- 171 Third, magistrates punished the "Heretick, Blasphemer,
[and) Seducer," generally by death or exile. 172 Fourth, government
enforced public "maintenance of the Worship, Priests and Of-
ficers.' 73 Finally, like national churches, representatives of the
Congregational church assembled in synods and councils. 174
Mary within a few years defaceth Edward's work and renders the king-
dom (after her grandfather Henry VII his pattern) all Popish. Mary's
short life and religion end together; and Elizabeth reviveth her brother
Edward's model, all Protestant.
Id.
168. See Yet More Bloody, supra note 41, at 389.
169. Miller, supra note 19, at 204 (quoting from Hireling).
170. Yet More Bloody, supra note 41, at 390; accord Arlin M. Adams & Charles
J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1559, 1619-20
(1989).
171. Yet More Bloody, supra note 41, at 390.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 391.
174. See id.
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Although a basic definition of an establishment, Williams' idea is a
clear analogue to the American idea that would later develop.
4. Church as Association in Society
As a final elaboration of the different jurisdictions of religion
and government, Williams posited that a church, which was a vol-
untary organization of believers, was like any "corporation, society,
or company"175 in civil society. As such, a church could retain their
records, hold disputations, and, generally, be free to run its own
affairs, like any other association in society. A church could even
"dissent, divide, break into schisms and factions, sue and implead
each other at law"-even "wholly break up and dissolve into pieces
and nothing."176 The church, in short, should be wholly autono-
mous in running its affairs.
Of course, the limit of church autonomy, like any association,
is the law and order of society, as explained above. 177 Short of
breaking the civil peace, none of the activities of the church will
cause "the peace of the city . . . [to] be in the least measure im-
paired or disturbed."' 78 This is "[blecause the essence or being of
the city, and so the well-being and peace thereof, is essentially dis-
tinct from those [religious or other] particular societies; the city
courts, city laws, city punishments distinct from theirs." 7 9
C. Summary
As we take stock of Williams' contributions to early American
religious thought, we see the significance of his work. Through his
seminal argument for cause of conscience, he elaborated the essen-
tial argument for inviolability of conscience in matters of religion,
which has become the foundation for religion as a preferred free-
dom. By extending this privilege to all, he set the basis for reli-
gious faith on tolerance and respect. This helped assure that
religion would not be a source of significant discord in society and
offered a key mechanism for the functioning of a pluralistic society.
These arguments for conscience and tolerance formed the founda-
tion of individual religious freedom in America.
175. Miller, supra note 19, at 117 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
178. Miller, supra note 19, at 117 (quoting from Bloody Tenent).
179. Id.
1999l
464 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 4:425
With his rooting of religious freedom in conscience, and his
elaboration of the value of religion, Williams might be thought of
as the intellectual father-or grandfather-of the Free Exercise
Clause. Free exercise of religion is grounded in the pre-Enlighten-
ment view that fidelity to conscience is a matter of duty to God. 80
A person should have the "right" to respond to divine command.
The value of conscience, thus, is that it frees a person from the
necessity of having to choose between secular and sectarian sover-
eigns.'18 Instead, conscience can act as the haven for a person's
beliefs. These ideas underscore the specialness of religion, which
the Free Exercise attempts to capture as a preferred value or
"right."
Institutionally, Williams also laid the basis for protecting reli-
gion from government, and government from religion. His main
strategy was separation-the first time this theory was advocated
and applied on this side of the Atlantic. Complementing separa-
tion was the division of religion and government into different ju-
risdictions, which would allow each to perform its core functions
optimally. Within this construct, a mixing of church and state was
identified as the core evil, resulting in the spilling of "civil blood."
From this, Williams set forth an essential criteria for identifying
establishments of religion, which constituted a serious threat to
religious freedom. Through these arguments, Williams made the
essential argument for nonestablishment of religion, picked up by
the Supreme Court in the last half of the twentieth century.
In sum, Roger Williams, writing in the middle 1600s, laid the
foundation for religious freedom in America, both from an individ-
ual and institutional perspective. Let us now trace, more carefully,
his influence on the framing of the First Amendment religious
protections.
III. ROGER WILLIAMS' FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE ON THE
FIRST A ENDMENT
Despite Roger Williams' notable contributions to the develop-
ment of religious liberty in the period before the First Amendment,
he appears, ironically, to have little direct influence on the framing
180. See Hall, supra note 12, at 513.
181. See id. at 514.
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of religious freedoms in the First Amendment. 8 2 In fact, by the
time of the ratification of the First Amendment, in 1791, he was
somewhat of a forgotten man. Instead, John Locke, Thomas Jeffer-
son, and James Madison were the main intellectual influences on
First Amendment religious freedoms, and they proceeded without
apparent direct influence from Williams.'83
Locke, Jefferson, and Madison were people of the Enlighten-
ment, reflecting its rationalist views, and articulating its rational-
ist rhetoric, including the language of "natural rights."18 4 On
church-state relations, they posited that each should be separate
from the other, as much to protect the body politic as religion. Jef-
ferson, in particular, was intent on realizing a new, civic republi-
can, theory of government. He was most concerned about
protecting the body politic from religion so that the new theory
might have a chance to survive.' 8 5 Jefferson's wall of separation,
therefore, was designed more to protect the state from religion
than the other way. In these ways, we might think of Jefferson as
the intellectual father of the Establishment Clause.
This Enlightenment view seems to have been the dominant
one animating the First Amendment. Williams' thought, by con-
trast, reflected the evangelical separatist school of thought. Wil-
liams spoke the language of religion, in contrast to the
Enlightenment discourse of the Framers. On church and state,
Williams advocated separation to protect the "Garden" from the
"Wilderness."18 6 Certainly he was the preeminent voice of this
182. See id. at 458.
183. See id. at 489.
184. Through such terminology, God-given rights were transformed into "ina-
lienable" civil rights. Locke, supra note 55, at 172-73. As "inalienable," rights-
whether God-given or naturally existing-could never be surrendered to any civil
authority. In this way, Locke translated the essentially religious rhetoric of the
Puritan Independents, including Williams, into the new language of "natural
rights." This more rationalist discourse, grounded in the Enlightenment, paved
the way for the reception of social contract theory and natural rights by the Ameri-
can Framers. While Locke's ideas were not terribly original, his articulation of
them in a new voice was a great accomplishment.
185. Jefferson, and other Enlightenment thinkers of the American Revolution,
feared the passion and irrationality that religion sometimes brought out in people.
See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 426-29
(1969); Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 368-69 (1991).
They viewed this as a threat to the rational discourse required for dispassionate
debate about public affairs.
186. Cotton's Letter Examined, supra note 1, at 392.
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view, although Williams, too, asserted that separation was in the
interest of the state.18 7 Williams' view influenced Isaac Backus, a
Baptist minister, and other religious and political figures of the
Constitutional period who contributed to the formation of First
Amendment freedoms. In this way evangelical separatism,
originated in America by Williams, complemented Enlightenment
ideals, providing a twin support for the idea of separation of church
and state. Thus, the First Amendment reflects these two main tra-
ditions, Enlightenment rationalism and evangelical separatism,
although the Enlightenment was the dominant tradition within
which the specific freedoms were framed, and also the one within
which the freedoms are now mainly understood."' How Roger
Williams became the forgotten man of religious freedom-eclipsed
by the Enlightenment-is the subject of this Part III.
Roger Williams was the most systematic American thinker on
religious freedom in the period before the First Amendment, as
Part II evidences.' 89 In fact, Williams was a deeper thinker on
religious freedom than either Thomas Jefferson' 9° or James
Madison. 191 Yet, there is no direct evidence that Williams influ-
enced overtly Locke, Jefferson, or Madison.
187. See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
188. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214
(1963) ("[Ihe views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came
to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of
most of our States.") (footnote omitted); see also id. at 260 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("'[Olur tradition of civil liberty rests not only on the secularism of a Thomas Jef-
ferson but also on the fervent sectarianism ... of a Roger Williams.'") (quoting
Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States 84 (1961)).
189. See generally Curry, supra note 10, at 93 (noting that no one in the 18th
century wrote as deeply on religious freedom as Williams and William Penn). In
fact, not until the late 18th century, when John Leland emerged, was there a
prominent, systematic thinker in America on religious freedoms that compared to
Williams. See id. at 182.
190. Jefferson is known mainly for his famous Danbury Church Letter, supra
note 3, where he posited his famous "wall of separation" metaphor. The document
is, after all, a letter, written a decade after the adoption of the First Amendment.
Jefferson is also famous for his authoring of the Virginia Bill for Establishing Reli-
gious Freedom, drafted in 1779, which is less than one thousand words. See Hall,
supra note 12, at 496 (citing Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom (June 12, 1779), reprinted in 5 The Founders' Constitution 77 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
191. Madison is most famous for his Memorial, which is about 10 pages as cited
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 63-72 (1947). Memorial was writ-
ten as a petition to oppose a Virginia proposal to establish support for Christian
schools. It served to rally opposition to the measure, leading to its defeat.
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Locke's apparent oversight of Williams seems most surprising,
since his A Letter Concerning Toleration is only about fifty years
removed from Williams' work, which, as we know, had influence in
England, including among prominent thinkers like Cromwell,
Henry Vane, John Owen, and John Milton.192 His fame was
easily greater in England than the colonies. It would thus seem
probable that Williams had some influence on the develop-
ment of English religious freedoms. 193 Given Williams' fame
in English inner circles, he would, presumably, have been
a logical person to draw upon for ideas. 194 Moreover, Locke's
A Letter Concerning Toleration resonates with the ideas of
Williams. 195
Madison also played an important role in assisting George Mason to write the Vir-
ginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. See Hall, supra note 12, at 507-08.
192. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. For discussion of Williams'
influence in America, see authorities collected in Adams & Emmerich, supra note
170, at 1564 n.17.
193. Professor Curry notes that ideas about toleration spread to America from
England from books, including Williams'. See Curry, supra note 10, at 18. It is
beyond the scope of this article to trace definitively the influence of Williams'
thought on England.
194. Historians debate the influence of Williams on Locke. Some have sug-
gested that Locke merely restated Williams' ideas. See, e.g., Winthrop S. Hudson,
John Locke: Heir of Puritan Political Theorists, in Calvinism and the Political Or-
der 108 (George L. Hunt ed., 1965):
The parallels with the thought of Roger Williams. . . are so close that
it is not an entirely implausible conjecture to suggest that Locke's major
contribution may have been to reduce the rambling, lengthy, and incoher-
ent exposition of the New England 'firebrand' to orderly, abbreviated, and
coherent form .... It is impossible to discover a single significant differ-
ence between the argument set forth by Williams and that later advanced
by Locke. They scarcely differ even in the details of its practical
application.
Id. at 117-18; see also David Little, Roger Williams and the Separation of Church
and State, in Religion and the State: Essays in Honor of Leo Pfeffer 7 (James E.
Wood, Jr. ed., 1985) ("[Tlhe similarities between the thought of Williams and
Locke on religious liberty are so evident that, quite possibly, Locke did little more
than translate Williams's often tedious and rambling arguments into succinct and
lucid prose."). Certainly Locke drew upon the arguments of English Puritan In-
dependents, like John Milton and John Owen, who exchanged ideas with Williams.
See id. However, there does not seem to be any direct evidence of Locke's reliance
on Williams. See Hall, supra note 12, at 489 n.173.
195. For example, like Williams, Locke set out an institutional arrangement of
separation by jurisdiction so that the state would not interfere with religion; ar-
gued that forced worship induced hypocrisy and not true belief; and hypothesized
that freedom of conscience was necessary to preserve civil peace. See Locke, supra
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Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration is important, in partic-
ular, because it was the primary influence on the English Act of
Toleration, of 1689, which guaranteed certain religious freedom in
England. 196 Because the American colonies remained subject to
English law, the Toleration Act applied in the New World, too. The
Toleration Act had the greatest impact on the loosening of religious
orthodoxy in the colonies, leading to a more tolerant climate along
the lines envisioned by Williams. 197 Seen in this light, Williams
was at least sixty-maybe 100-years ahead of his time, and
achieved, perhaps, influence indirectly on Locke and American
ideas.
John Locke is also important because he was the primary in-
fluence on Jefferson and Madison, the two main influences on the
formulation of First Amendment guarantees. Through the efforts
of Jefferson and Madison on behalf of religious freedom in Virginia,
that colony, and not Rhode Island, became the model for American
freedom. 198 There are also key similarities in the religious thought
of Jefferson' 99 and Madison, 2° ° as measured against Williams'
work, which suggests, again, the resonance of Williams' ideas.
note 55, at 172-75, 183, 219. For a detailed comparison of the similarities between
the work of Williams and Locke, see Hall, supra note 12, at 490-95.
196. See Curry, supra note 10, at 79. The Act actually only allowed dissenters
to exist within society. They yet remained second-class citizens. See id. at 54.
197. See Hall, supra note 12, at 489. Some colonies, such as Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, had religious guarantees in place that were more
tolerant than those provided in the Act of Toleration. See Curry, supra note 10, at
79-80.
198. For example, the Court in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13
(1947), relied heavily on this Virginia experience. See also McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 437-40 (1961) (noting the significance of the Virginia experience to
development of religious freedom).
199. For example, like Williams, Jefferson asserted that coercion of conscience
is inconsistent with true belief; official support of religion leads to its corruption;
and that opinion, including religious opinion, is not within the jurisdiction of gov-
ernment, echoing Williams' original argument of protection for religion based on
different jurisdictions. Compare Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom, supra note 190, at 77 (noting Jefferson's argument that religious opinions are
not within the civil government's jurisdiction) with Miller, supra note 19, at 131-33
(quoting Williams' argument that "civil weapons are improper" in religious mat-
ters); see also Hall, supra note 12, at 495-505 (providing a detailed comparison of
Jefferson's thought in relation to Williams').
200. For example, like Williams, Madison believed that conscience is a gift of
God and, therefore, cannot be surrendered to the social order; religious belief and
opinion cannot be coerced; religion is inalienable and, therefore, beyond the control
of government; and that assessments and establishments violate the principle of
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After his death, in 1683, however, Williams' views were no
longer discussed in America. Rhode Island, Williams' "lively ex-
periment," became a despised outcast, and would not play a role in
the development of American religious concepts for the next 100
years,201 despite the colony being the first founded on religious
freedom. "[No library catalogue published in the American colo-
nies listed any of his works."20 2 Thus, Williams was a forgotten
man until rediscovered by Isaac Backus, the Baptist minister and
thinker, in 1773.203
Why Williams and Rhode Island became forgotten is an inter-
esting question. Williams was not highly regarded by his Ameri-
can contemporaries. 20 4 Given his low standing, it is perhaps not so
equality open to believers. Compare Memorial, cited in Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 app. at 64 (1947) (discussing how an individual's duty to God
supercedes the duty owed to society; how an individual must follow his or her mind
and not the "dictates of other men;" the inalienability of religion; and the negative
effects of assessments and establishments) with Letter to Endicot, supra note 70,
at 225-26 (discussing the need for individuals to be true to conscience) and Miller,
supra note 19, at 143 (quoting Williams' argument from Bloody Tenent that indi-
viduals should be free to make their own religious choices) and id. at 130, 133, 147
(quoting Williams' arguments from Bloody Tenent). For a detailed comparison of
Williams' thoughts to Madison's, see Hall, supra note 12, at 505-13.
201. See Hall, supra note 12, at 488. "'[Ailmost no one in colonial New England
ever praised his experiment, sought his advice, quoted his books, or tried to imitate
his practices.'" Id. at 488-89 (quoting 1 William G. McLoughlin, New England
Dissent 1630-1833, at 8 (1971)).
202. Curry, supra note 10, at 91. "[Nlot even his anti-Quaker treatise, George
Fox... ." was listed. Id. This is quite surprising since George Fox, published in
Boston, was the only work Williams published in America.
203. Backus was a comprehensive thinker on religious freedom too, elaborating
some of Williams' basic ideas on separatism and jurisdictional division between
church and state. Williams was Backus' hero, and he made Williams the focus of
his work. Yet, even Backus was careful to draw upon John Locke for arguments
about religious liberty, couching them in the natural rights rhetoric of the time.
He preferred to refer to Williams as a noble figure from history. See LeRoy Moore,
Religious Liberty: Roger Williams and the Revolutionary Era, 34 Church Hist. 57,
70 (1965).
Backus also worked to disestablish the Congregational church in Massachu-
setts, was a political activist, and drafter of a Massachusetts bill of rights. He
became a supporter of the Constitution, especially its Article VI prohibition on reli-
gious test oaths, despite his Antifederalist sympathies. See Adams & Emmerich,
supra note 170, at 1592-93 (citing 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 148-49 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836) (Feb. 4, 1788)) [hereinafter Elliot Debates].
204. An historian concluded "he can scarcely be said to have been prominent in
the view even of his own little public." Guild, supra note 5, at 48. His name was
"handed down to us by Puritan writers loaded with reproach." Id. at 47. Cotton
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surprising that he was ignored. Further, by the time of the Consti-
tution's framing, Americans no longer spoke about their world in
primarily religious terms. Thus, Williams' theocentric rhetoric
seemed foreign to the rationalist milieu of the time.
Similarly, Rhode Island was viewed by neighboring colonies as
unsavory, with a reputation for "religious radicalism and liber-
tinism."20 5 Given the widespread religious orthodoxy of the colo-
nies of this time, Rhode Island's experiment in liberty of conscience
was too far advanced, during this period, to serve as a model for
the development of religious freedom. 20 6 Like Williams, Rhode Is-
land, too, became an unpleasant memory, best forgotten. So for-
gotten, in fact, that when the name of Rhode Island did come up in
discussion, people displayed an ignorance of its religious
arrangements. 207
Backus and others in the evangelical separatist movement re-
introduced Williams' ideas to the debate about religious free-
dom. 208 This group included the Baptists, who became key allies of
James Madison, in Virginia and the country as a whole, as
Madison sought to build support for the national Constitution.
viewed him as part of the lunatic fringe, possessing an overheated brain. See
Curry, supra note 10, at 15-17.
205. Curry, supra note 10, at 91. "The reputation for 'profaneness and atheism'
in the 'Eastern Parts of the neighboring Province,'... still clung to it." Id. (citation
omitted). Cotton Mather once famously observed that Rhode Island had everyone
but Catholics and real Christians. See id. at 51.
Yet, in spite of "such social opprobrium, Rhode Island continued on its chosen
way, neither bending under external pressure nor overreacting to it." Id. at 20-21.
Still, its reputation for radicalness stuck to it. When the colony issued paper
money as currency, its stigma of irresponsibility was reinforced. See id. at 21.
206. See id.
207. Professor Curry catalogues a number of incidents where people of the 18th
century assumed that Rhode Island had established churches, when this was not
the case. For example, "New York Presbyterian William Smith, an ardent oppo-
nent of the New York Anglican establishment" had assumed "that Rhode Island
had an establishment of religion similar to that of the rest of New England, even
though the colony had established no church and had decreed that all ministers be
supported by voluntary contributions." Id. at 91.
208. Other champions of evangelical separatism included John Witherspoon,
"the only member of the clergy to sign the Declaration of Independence." Adams &
Emmerich, supra note 170, at 1593. Witherspoon was president of the college of
New Jersey, which later became Princeton University, and served as John
Madison's mentor in law and ethics. See id. Roger Sherman was also an impor-
tant advocate of this pietistic tradition. He, of course, signed the Declaration of
Independence, Articles of Confederation, and Constitution, and served on the com-
mittee that drafted the First Amendment. See id. at 1594.
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Key points of agreement between Madison and the Baptists in-
cluded ideals of nondiscrimination on account of religious belief or
worship; no national religion; and full and equal rights of con-
science for a112 09-ideas all originating with Roger Williams. Peo-
ple during the time of the framing also inherited from Williams the
thought that mixing government with church inevitably led to a
corruption of religion, and that coercion destroys true piety.210
Thus, adherents of Williams had some influence in the fixing of
religious guarantees. Through these discreet tracks, Williams
spoke to the generation that framed the Constitution.
In sum, as we compare the originality of Williams' work to
those most responsible for the framing of First Amendment reli-
gious guarantees, the imprint of Williams on the First Amendment
becomes apparent. First, Williams' thought had an important in-
fluence on English thought at the crucial time when religious pro-
tections were being fixed. This influence, presumably, had some
impact on John Locke. Second, there is general resonance of Wil-
liams' thought in the work of Locke, Jefferson, and Madison-the
main intellectual influences on the First Amendment. Third, Wil-
liams' more specific arguments arose, again, through the efforts of
evangelicals, most notably Baptists, like Isaac Backus, who con-
tributed to the adoption of the Constitution.211
Thus, the essence of Williams' thought underlies our First
Amendment, even if by unacknowledged or unseen ways. This core
includes the inalienability of conscience in matters of faith; con-
demnation of coercion of conscience; and nonestablishment of reli-
gion. These are the polestars of our religious freedom. These ideas
continue to resonate today in the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court, which Part IV now examines.
IV. ROGER WILLIAMS IN MODERN SUPREME
COURT JURISPRUDENCE
Comparing Roger Williams' thought to that articulated in
modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is striking how much the
209. See id. at 1580.
210. See id. at 1562.
211. Backus, for example, believed the First Amendment to be the best guaran-
tee of religious liberty. "He described the new Constitution as a door opened 'for
securing equal liberty, as never was before opened to any people upon earth.'"
Curry, supra note 10, at 194 (quoting Elliot Debates, supra note 203, at 151).
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Court's work resonates with the ideas of Williams. This is all the
more notable because the Court has only rarely cited Williams,212
instead relying mainly on the ideas of John Locke, Thomas Jeffer-
son, and James Madison in fashioning First Amendment law. The
imprint of Williams' ideas, in the work of the Court, can be traced
to the fashioning of both individual and institutional protections,
as Williams had originally envisioned the strategy for religious
freedom. From an individual perspective, the main connection be-
tween the two is the rooting of belief in conscience and freedom
from coercion thereof, and governmental neutrality (including
equality and tolerance of others' conscience). The main institu-
tional similarities include separation, different jurisdictions for
church and state, the securing of social peace, and nonestablish-
ment of religion. This Part surveys the resonance of Williams'
thought in the Court through this format.
A. Individual Protections
1. Conscience
Like Roger Williams, the Court roots religious freedom in the
inviolability of individual conscience, phrased in modern rights
language as "an important area of privacy which the First Amend-
ment fences off from government."213 As elaborated on in contem-
porary First Amendment law:
[T]he individual freedom of conscience protected by the First
Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith
or none at all. This conclusion derives support not only from
the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of con-
science, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs
worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice
by the faithful, and from recognition of the fact that the polit-
ical interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond intol-
erance among Christian sects-or even intolerance among
212. See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 n.11 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (noting Roger Williams was the first to view the Establishment
Clause as a means to protect churches); School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963) ("[Ihe views of Madison and Jefferson, pre-
ceded by Roger Williams, came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitu-
tion but likewise in those of most of our States.") (footnote omitted); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 n.20 (1962) (stating Williams "was one of the earliest
exponents of the doctrine of separation of church and state.").
213. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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"religions"-to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and
the uncertain.214
No case represents the idea of inviolability of conscience better
than Lee v. Weisman, where the Court invalidated the rendering of
a prayer at a middle school graduation because of significant state
participation in the composition of the prayer, and because the ren-
dering of the prayer created a conflict of conscience for those stu-
dents torn between their cause of conscience and desire to
conform. 215 Picking up, seemingly, from Roger Williams' cause of
conscience, the Court observes:
A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of
belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that reli-
gious faith is real, not imposed.
The lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in the
modern world as in the 18th century when it was written.
One timeless lesson is that if citizens are subjected to state-
sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows its own duty
to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and
belief which is the mark of a free people. To compromise that
principle today would be to deny our own tradition and forfeit
our standing to urge others to secure the protections of that
tradition for themselves. 216
That the Court so defines freedom-located in belief and con-
science-illustrates the power and prescience of Roger Williams'
thought. It is also worth observing that, like Williams, the Court
recognizes that conscience might conflict with the aims of govern-
ment. To resolve that conflict, the Court, significantly, calibrates
religious freedom from the perspective of the dissenter: "IFlor the
dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception that
she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience
will not allow, the injury is no less real."2 17 Where there is a "real
conflict of conscience .... It is a tenet of the First Amendment that
the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her
214. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53-54 (1985) (footnotes omitted); see also
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individ-
ual may choose cannot be restricted by law.").
215. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). In its rooting of freedom in conscience, Lee stands at
the top of the Court's long line of school prayer cases. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S.
203; Engel, 370 U.S. 421.
216. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
217. Id. at 593.
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rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-
sponsored religious practice."218 In Williams' time the location of
freedom in conscience was itself novel. A conflict between con-
science and the state was most likely to be resolved in favor of the
state. By the time of Lee, by contrast, we observe the Court's free-
ing of conscience from the coercive power of the state pursuant to
modern rights doctrine. In this way, Lee attests to the revolution
of constitutionalism.219 With conscience as the foundation of reli-
gious freedom, the Court, too, then relies on Williams' core idea:
persecution or coercion of conscience is the "bloody tenet."
2. Coercion
Freedom from coercion of conscience is a touchstone of reli-
gious freedom that runs deep in the Free Exercise jurisprudence of
the Court. As far back as Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court ob-
served that the Free Exercise Clause "forestalls compulsion by law
of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of wor-
ship."220 More recently, the Court observed, in School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, that "a violation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause is predicated on coercion... [a] show[ing] [of] the coer-
cive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the
practice of his religion."221 While today it is a matter of some de-
bate whether a showing of coercion is a precondition to establish-
ing a Free Exercise violation, 222 certainly a showing of coercion is
sufficient to make out a violation.
218. Id. at 596.
219. Of course, as the Lee Court observes: "[Nlot ... every state action implicat-
ing religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive .... We know too that
sometimes to endure social isolation or even anger may be the price of conscience
or nonconformity." Id. at 597-98.
220. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
221. 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
222. Compare Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (noting that "there are heightened concerns
with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elemen-
tary and secondary public schools") (citations omitted), and Schempp, 374 U.S. at
223 (stating that "a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coer-
cion"), with Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting proof of
governmental coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause viola-
tion); id. at 618 (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing instances in which the Court
declared invalid many "noncoercive state laws and practices conveying a message
of religious endorsement"), and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing a state-sponsored moment of silence in
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Freedom from coercion of conscience is a core postulate of the
Free Exercise Clause. Starting with West Virginia Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette,223 the Court has recognized that the coercive
effect of compulsory affirmation of belief, such as the compulsory
flag salute there at issue, violates the freedom of conscience at the
root of religious freedom. The line of school prayer cases2 24 further
substantiates the truncation of conscience caused by participation
in state sponsored group prayer exercises. 225
The major cases successfully making out a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause too can be supported on the coercion of con-
science justification. In Sherbert v. Verner,226 the landmark Free
Exercise case establishing the traditional strict scrutiny frame-
work for assessing a Free Exercise claim, the Court predicated its
finding on the core idea that a state "may not constitutionally ap-
ply the eligibility provisions [for unemployment compensation] so
as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions re-
specting the day of rest."227
Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligi-
bility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her reli-
gion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is
unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between fol-
lowing the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her reli-
gion in order to accept work, on the other hand. 2 28
Likewise, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,229 the Court predicated its finding
of a violation of the Free Exercise Clause on the fact the Wisconsin
compulsory education law "compels them [the Amish], under
threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds
with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs."230 This carried
"a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and reli-
public schools from a state-sponsored vocal prayer on the grounds that the latter,
while not explicitly coercive, was a "manifestly religious exercise").
223. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
224. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. 577; Schempp, 374 U.S. 203; Engel, 370 U.S. 421.
225. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
226. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
227. Id. at 410.
228. Id. at 404.
229. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
230. Id. at 218 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)).
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gious practice .... "231 These cases demonstrate that, in the area
of conscience, the teachings of Roger Williams remain vital today.
3. Governmental Neutrality: All Faiths Tolerated,
None Persecuted
The theme of governmental neutrality in the face of different
religions is another strong resonance of the work of Roger Williams
in the Court's jurisprudence. The idea of neutrality has two mean-
ings, both for Williams and the Court. First, neutrality is a guar-
antee of nonpreferentialism among different religions. As such,
neutrality safeguards the dignity of each individual's conscience.
This aspect of neutrality is an individual protection, and accord-
ingly, will be evaluated here. A second idea of neutrality is separa-
tion of church and state on account of the teaching of history that
when government favors one religion over another, powerful
groups will curry favor with the government in an attempt to bring
about a fusion of church and state.232 This is, obviously, an insti-
tutional strategy of religious protection, with strong parallels to
the argument for separation of church and state, and will be dis-
cussed in the section covering institutional protections.
Roger Williams advocated official neutrality over matters of
conscience so that all persons would have an equal chance to pur-
sue their beliefs free from the coercive power of the state. One per-
son's act of conscience stood, on an official plane, equal to others.
At bottom, this idea of neutrality was a principle of nondiscrimina-
tion and tolerance for believers.
These ideas resonate strongly in the jurisprudence of the
Court. Starting with Everson v. Board of Education, the seminal
Establishment Clause case, a fundamental tenet of American reli-
gious freedom is that government may not "aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."233 Instead, the First
Amendment "requires the state to be . . . neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers .... State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them."23 4 This principle has been consistently articulated, 23
231. Id.
232. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
233. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
234. Id. at 18.
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and applied to invalidate governmental preference of one religion
over another and, even, religion over nonreligion. 236
From an individual perspective, official neutrality facilitates
voluntary choice concerning religion, free from state compul-
sion.237 A state preferencing of religion sends "a message that reli-
gion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred,"238
tending to divide religion along such preferred lines. Instead, offi-
cial neutrality provides that there is an equality of opportunity in
the realm of religious belief: "[AIll creeds must be tolerated and
none favored."239 Religious freedoms are equally available to all-
to "the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith
such as Islam or Judaism."240 As Roger Williams instructed,
"[albhorrence of religious persecution and intolerance is a basic
part of our heritage."24 1
235. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 611-12 (1992); Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 206, 216
(1963).
236. See Texas Monthly, Inc., 489 U.S. at 17 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)
(discussing how the Court struck down tax exemption benefiting only religious pe-
riodicals, even though not preferencing one religion over another, because statu-
tory preference for religious publications "effectively endorses religious belief.");
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (discussing how the Court struck
down Maryland constitutional requirement that state public officials declare belief
in God because government "can[not] constitutionally pass laws or impose require-
ments which aid all religions as against non-believers.").
237. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 ("A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk
that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious
faith is real, not imposed."); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222 ("And a further reason for
neutrality is found in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes . . . the right of
every person to freely choose his own course ... free of any compulsion from the
state. This the Free Exercise Clause guarantees.").
238. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (quoting Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)) (emphasis
added).
239. Lee, 505 U.S. at 590.
240. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985); accord Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (stating the state "cannot hamper its citizens in the
free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual
Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of
it."); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) ("The First Amend-
ment... secure[s] to every sect the free exercise of its faith.").
241. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961).
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B. Institutional Protections
Like Roger Williams, the Court has sought to protect religious
freedom, not only through individual freedoms, but also a range of
institutional protections by which the affairs of state would be dis-
entangled from those of religion. The Court's strategy, in fact, mir-
rors Williams' in a general way: separation, different jurisdictions,
and nonestablishment.
1. Separation
Roger Williams' most famous institutional argument was, of
course, the placement of a "wall of Separation between the Garden
of the Church and the Wilderness of the world"2 42 to protect the
purity of the church, but also free the state from the obligation to
act divine and thereby more easily address the common welfare.
As noted, the Court credits Thomas Jefferson with this idea, even
though Williams' articulation of the thought predated Jefferson's
by some 150 years.243
Certainly the "wall of separation" metaphor has played a
prominent role in the Court's thinking, going back to Reynolds v.
United States.24 In the modern era, starting with Everson, the
Court first emphasized a rather strict form of separation, at least
rhetorically.245 Justice Rutledge, in his Everson dissent, captured
this sense well: "[Tihe object [of the Establishment Clause] ... was
to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of
religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding
every form of public aid or support for religion."246 Numerous
cases followed this separationist interpretation, especially in the
context of state aid to schools.247 The (in)famous Lemon v. Kurtz-
242. Cotton's Letter Examined, supra note 1, at 392.
243. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. There is no evidence that Jeffer-
son took the idea from Williams.
244. 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
245. 330 U.S. at 16, 18.
246. Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
247. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (invalidating the state's
funding of instructional equipment and paying the costs of field trips in nonpublic
schools to students in nonpublic schools); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (in-
validating reimbursement of nonpublic schools for costs on teacher's salaries and
materials used in secular courses).
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man test might be thought of as an attempt to construct a separa-
tionist strategy. 248
More recent cases have moved away from the "wall of separa-
tion" metaphor, first blurring the distinction, 249 and then seem-
ingly abandoning it.250 The dissonance in .the Court's view goes
back, of course, to the early cases, like Everson, which employed
separationist rhetoric, while rendering an accomodationist re-
sult.251 Certainly it is easier to announce the principle than apply
it.
2. The Different Jurisdictions of Church and State
Roger Williams was the first American to theorize about reli-
gious freedom through the identification of different jurisdictions
for church and state, an amplification of his argument for separa-
tion. With each separate from the other, both stood a better chance
to thrive. Social peace might thereby be secured. This was among
the most innovative of Williams' arguments, one which resonates
well in the jurisprudence of the Court.
Numerous strands of Williams' thought are evident in the
Court's decisions. First, the union of government and church will
result only in harm to both. Second, therefore, protections of reli-
gious freedom must be designed to keep government out of reli-
gion, and religion out of government, to the extent possible. Third,
certainly no part of government can be involved in judging religion.
Fourth, government should also not interfere with conscience and
belief. And fifth, while government is disseized from entering the
248. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). To find a violation of the Establishment
Clause, the test holds: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion ... finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entan-
glement with religion." Id.
249. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("[The metaphor itself is
not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in
fact exists between church and state .... Nor does the Constitution require com-
plete separation of church and state."). Even in Lemon, the Court observed: "the
line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable bar-
rier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." 403 U.S. at
614.
250. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (invalidating
state sponsored creche, but validating state sponsored menorah on endorsement,
not separation, theory).
251. In Everson, the Court sustained the state's provision of bussing costs for
Catholic school children. 330 U.S. at 18.
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sphere of religion, it has a role to play in effectuating the common
good.
Exploring this affinity more carefully, first, the Court reads
the lesson of history, as Williams, to instruct that a union of gov-
ernment and church will result in harm to both. "The history of
governmentally established religion, both in England and in this
country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with
one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that
it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those
who held contrary beliefs."25 2 The harm to religion from such a
union is the "risk... [to] freedom of belief and conscience,"253 cer-
tainly the cornerstone of Williams' theory of religious freedom.
The harm to government is its "abandon[ment of] its obligation as
guarantor of democracy." 254 Thus, we can conclude, as the Court:
"Ithe lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in the modern
world as in the eighteenth century when it was written."255 These
were also the lessons of Williams, in the seventeenth century,
which he experienced, wrote about, and prophesized.
Second, in view of such lesson, the best strategy for religious
freedom is to keep each out of the way of the other. As the Court
has explained, "Itihe objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the
intrusion of either into the precincts of the other."256 One way of
accomplishing this is pursuit of the "wall of separation" metaphor
discussed above.257 Another way is by removing from government
the power to legislate over religion, echoing Williams' idea: "The
Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate leg-
islative concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive,
area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of
some transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that
belief or disbelief."258 For this proposition, the Court has cited, ap-
252. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
253. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
254. Id. at 607 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 592.
256. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
257, See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
258. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961); accord Lemon, 403
U.S. at 625 ("Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be
entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded
from the affairs of government."); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (stating a measure advancing or inhibiting religion "ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.").
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provingly, Williams,259 although it is clear that the Court is guided
more by John Locke's jurisdictional argument than Williams'. 260
Third, since government has no power over religion, it cer-
tainly has no business judging religion. This, of course, is one of
Williams' core arguments, as also approvingly cited by the Court in
Engel v. Vitale.261 This idea, in part, has led to the Court's long-
held reluctance to judge the legitimacy of religion or religious
belief.2 62
Fourth, government also certainly has no power over con-
science and belief. "The free exercise of religion means, first and
foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doc-
trine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes
all 'governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.' ' 263
Fifth, and last, while belief and conscience are beyond govern-
mental authority, government has a legitimate role to play in real-
izing the common good. Roger Williams himself struggled in
working out the line between religious freedom and civil jurisdic-
tion.264 The Court too has struggled over this line.265
259. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 n.20 (1962).
260. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring).
261. 370 U.S. at 434 n.20 ("To Williams, it was no part of the business or com-
petence of a civil magistrate to interfere in religious matters . . ").
262. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is not
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices
to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.")
(citations omitted); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 245 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
First Amendment forbids governmental inquiry into the verity of religious be-
liefs."); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) ("Man's relation to his God
was made no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he
pleased and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views.").
263. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)); accord Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940):
Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one's convictions about the ultimate
mystery of the universe and man's relation to it is placed beyond the reach
of law. Government may not interfere with organized or individual ex-
pression of belief or disbelief. Propagation of belief-or even of disbelief-
in the supernatural is protected, whether in church or chapel, mosque or
synagogue, tabernacle or meeting-house.
Id. at 593.
264. See supra notes 83-112 and accompanying text.
265. The early work of the Court followed the simple dichotomy of protection of
belief, but not action, advocated by John Locke and, to a degree, by Thomas Jeffer-
son. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961) ("[T]he legislative pow-
ers of government reach actions only, and not opinions . . . .") (alterations in
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3. Social Peace
Protecting church and state from each other had the added ob-
jective, in Roger Williams' view, of securing social peace, no small
accomplishment in the time of Williams. The securing of social
peace is a necessary precondition to the flourishing of a pluralistic
society, which had some roots in Williams' day but most certainly
is a state of affairs today.
The theme of securing social peace is a central concern of the
Court. In Engel, the Court noted the disruption of social peace, in
sixteenth century England, caused by governmental establish-
ments of religion, such as officially approved prayer and forms of
worship.266 The resulting social divisiveness formed a rationale
for the Court's conclusion that "government... should stay out of
the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave
that purely religious function to the people . .267 In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the Court observed: "political division along religious
lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amend-
original) (quoting 8 Works of Thomas Jefferson 113); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 166 (1879) ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices.").
With the landmark case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court
recognized that religiously-inspired acts too might, in the right circumstance-like
the Seventh Day Adventist's refusal on religious grounds to work Saturdays-
merit protection as religious freedom. See id. at 409-10. Sherbert thereby repre-
sents a move in the direction of Williams who, while advocating obedience to gen-
eral laws addressing the common welfare, also recognized certain religiously
inspired acts as acts of conscience meriting religious protection. See supra notes
83-112 and accompanying text.
In Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82
(1990), the Court held that religiously inspired smoking of peyote was nevertheless
subject to the criminal law, the Court has returned to the position of John Locke
that religious claims do not excuse compliance with general laws. See Locke, supra
note 55, at 172-75.
266. 370 U.S. at 425-27.
267. Id. at 435. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), the Court stated:
The reason for the choice of a rabbi is not disclosed by the record, but the
potential for divisiveness over the choice of a particular member of the
clergy to conduct the ceremony is apparent.
Divisiveness, of course, can attend any state decision respecting reli-
gions, and neither its existence nor its potential necessarily invalidates
the State's attempts to accommodate religion in all cases. The potential
for divisiveness is of particular relevance here though, because it centers
around an overt religious exercise in a secondary school environment ....
Id. at 587-88.
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ment was intended to protect. The potential divisiveness of such
conflict is a threat to the normal political process."268
4. Nonestablishment
Roger Williams argued against established churches because
he believed they coerced belief, caused persecution, and made for
an unseemly alliance between church and state to the detriment of
each. His essential argument was against the establishment of a
national church which, as we have seen, outlined the basic argu-
ment against establishments generally.269 The core of Williams'
argument resonates in the Establishment Clause.
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court echoed the es-
sence of Williams' idea:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa.270
268. 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695
(1970) (Harlan, J., separate opinion)); see also Paul A. Freund, Comment, Public
Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1692 (1969) (discussing why reli-
gious guarantees, unlike other basic guarantees such as freedom of the press, and
search and seizure, should be left out of the political process). In Lemon, the Court
invalidated the state salary supplement to religious teachers based, in part, on
"[tihe potential for political divisiveness" aggravated by its "need for continuing
annual appropriations...." 403 U.S. at 623.
269. See supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
270. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (emphasis added). Compare id. (noting that gov-
ernments must not be active endorsers of religious or give preferential treatment
to one religion over another), with Williams' idea supra notes 167-74 and accompa-
nying text (noting that all churches were equal and thus no church could claim
sanctions over another).
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Since Everson, the Court has been working on more sophisticated
definitions of establishments, such as that in the Lemon case, 271 as
it has sought, until recently, to realize a separationist vision.
Like Williams, the Court has often drawn on the history of
England to illustrate the danger of establishments. In Engel, for
example, the Court recited the same English history so instructive
to Williams. The "very practice of establishing governmentally
composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons
which caused many of our early colonists to leave England and
seek religious freedom in America."272 Echoing the thoughts of
Williams, the Court continued:
The controversies over the Book [of Common Prayer] and
what should be its content repeatedly threatened to disrupt
the peace of that country as the accepted forms of prayer in
the established church changed with the views of the particu-
lar ruler that happened to be in control at the time ....
By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our his-
tory shows that there was a widespread awareness among
many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church and
State. These people knew, some of them from bitter personal
experience, that one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of
the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Govern-
ment's placing its official stamp of approval upon one partic-
ular kind of prayer or one particular from of religious
services. They knew the anguish, hardship and bitter strife
that could come when zealous religious groups struggled with
one another to obtain the Government's stamp of approval
from each King, Queen, or Protector that came to temporary
power.2 73
Like Williams, the Court observes the lesson of history.
The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to
stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige
of the Federal Government would be used to control, support
or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can
say-that the people's religions must not be subjected to the
271. 403 U.S. at 612-13 ("First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion... finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.'") (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668) (citations omitted).
272. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
273. Id. at 426, 429.
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pressures of government for change each time a new political
administration is elected to office. 27 4
Through the foregoing assessment of the Court's jurisprudence
against the background of Roger Williams' thought, we discern the
continuing resonance of Williams' ideas. That Williams' ideas yet
ring so clearly and presciently is a major testament to the original-
ity and power of his thought.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS
Roger Williams developed the main ideas on religious freedom
that underlie our First Amendment. These ideas include the invio-
lability of conscience in matters of faith, the decrying of coercion of
conscience, and advocacy of tolerance and equality for contrasting
claims of conscience. These thoughts form a fundamental compo-
nent of our Free Exercise Clause protections. Roger Williams also
advanced the idea of separation of church and state to protect each
from the other; identified separate jurisdictions for church and
state so that the claims of one would be insulated from the other,
and thereby secure social peace; and advocated nonestablishment
of religion as a guarantee of religious freedom and democratic in-
tegrity. These ideas comprise the core of our Establishment
Clause guarantees. The problems contemplated by Roger Wil-
liams, and their solution, still occupy the Supreme Court today.
Yet, Williams' influence on the framing of the First Amendment is
indirect, at best, and his influence on the Court is not substantial.
Perhaps a reassessment of Williams' place in the development of
ideas is in order, especially as to how religious freedoms should
unfold.
Looking beyond the history of the First Amendment, Roger
Williams stands out as the very first American, and among the
most original, thinkers on religious freedom and church-state rela-
tions. He was, in actuality, a prophet on the relation of man's soul
to civil society, foreseeing a course for individual dignity and social
success well ahead of his time. Williams' work, and the example
he set in his life, are a testament to the idea that freedom is a
condition of the human spirit.
Owing to the power of his thought and the courage of his con-
victions, Williams still speaks to us today-as a man of honor and
274. Id. at 429-30.
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fortitude who sought to work out a way by which he could be true
to his soul and yet function honestly in the world. This was no
small task, in his world or our world. Balancing individual integ-
rity against social demands is always problematic. But, Williams
was successful in this endeavor, and he has much to teach us. One
timeless lesson is to be true to oneself. Yet, in doing so, one must
also learn to appreciate the claims of others. No person can be so
sure of truth, or his way, as to justify imposing it on others. Toler-
ance and respect of others, amidst diversity, are virtues necessary
to self-respect and social cohesion. In these ways, Williams demon-
strated that it is possible to achieve religious freedom in society,
for all, and that the two can coexist peaceably. We can thus see
that Williams was as much a social, as religious, prophet. These
lessons of Williams are an enduring legacy.
